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Abstract 
Objectives 
The study investigated the efficacy of an online multi-session cognitive bias modification 
for interpretation (CBM-I) package for reducing worry and negative interpretive bias in 
individuals presenting with clinical levels of generalised anxiety.  
Design 
Single case-series using a non-concurrent multiple-baseline across participant design 
with follow-up.  
Method 
Seven patients referred from Psychological Wellbeing Services completed a seven day 
CBM-I programme at home via the internet. The CBM-I task trained the participants to 
imagine ambiguous scenarios and to interpret them in a benign or positive manner. To 
assess change in worry, anxiety and interpretive bias, participants completed a battery of 
self report measures.  
Results 
Two participants demonstrated a positive response in their level of worry upon starting 
the CBM-I training and for both, gains were maintained one week after its completion. 
For the sample as a whole, negative interpretation bias reduced at post CBM-I and at one 
week follow-up.  
Conclusions 
The results indicate the potential value of CBM-I as a clinical tool for modifying 
interpretation bias in patients experiencing clinical levels of generalised anxiety. The 
ability of CBM-I to attenuate generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) associated 
symptomatology appears equivocal. In light of methodological constraints, the findings 
are tentative warranting further investigation.  
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Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
 The chapter begins with an overview of the symptoms and epidemiology of 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD). General cognitive theory as applied to pathological 
worry; the defining feature of GAD, is described followed by a consideration of GAD - 
specific cognitive conceptualisations and the efficacy of cognitive-based treatments. An 
information processing understanding of GAD is then presented, focusing on the role of 
interpretation bias. Following this, computer-based tasks that attempt to modify interpretation 
bias in a bid to ameliorate GAD associated symptoms (called ‘cognitive bias modification for 
interpretation’; CBM-I) are discussed. A structured review of the literature critiques studies 
that have investigated CBM-I specifically in anxious individuals. Recent developments in 
understanding the importance of imagery in CBM-I are then described. The chapter 
concludes by outlining the research hypotheses investigated in the present study.    
1.2 Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) 
 1.2.1 Symptoms. 
 According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-fifth edition 
(DSM-V), GAD is a disorder characterised by excessive, uncontrollable worry and anxiety 
about a number of different events or activities that causes symptoms such as restlessness, 
muscle tension and irritability (American Psychiatric Association; APA, 2013). For a formal 
diagnosis to be considered using the DSM-V classification, all symptoms must have been 
present for at least 6 months and cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational or other important areas of functioning (APA, 2013). 
 1.2.2 Prevalence and epidemiology.     
 GAD is one of the most common anxiety disorders seen in primary care with a current    
prevalence rate of between 3.7% and 8%, and a 12 month prevalence rate of 10% (Holaway, 
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Rodebaugh, & Heimburg, 2006). Investigations of clinical populations have found the typical 
age of onset of GAD to be between the late teens and late 20s, with later onset occurring 
when GAD develops after another anxiety disorder (e.g., Barlow, Blanchard, Vermilyea, 
Vermilyea, & DiNardo, 1986; Yonkers, Warshaw, Massion, & Keller, 1996).  
Epidemiology surveys and long term investigations have found GAD to be a 
pervasive condition. In the Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) study in the United States, 
40% of respondents with GAD reported having had it for more than five years (Blazer, 
Hughes, George, Swartz, & Boyer, 1991). Participants in clinical samples have often reported 
suffering from GAD for more than 20 years (Barlow et al., 1986). Regarding remission rates, 
Yonkers et al. (1996) found that only 40% of individuals with GAD were in full remission of 
symptoms after two years. The same study later found the full remission rate to be 38% after 
five years, with 27% experiencing a full relapse at some point during the follow-up (Yonkers, 
Dyck, Warshaw, & Keller, 2000).   
The degree of co-morbidity between GAD and other psychiatric disorders is high. 
Sanderson and Barlow (1990) found that 59% of their 22 patients meeting GAD criteria also 
met criteria for social phobia. They also found that 27% met criteria for panic disorder and 
that depression was reported by 14%. Yonkers et al. (1996) reported that of their GAD 
sample, 52% also fulfilled panic disorder or panic with agoraphobia criteria, 32% had clinical 
levels of social phobia and 37% fulfilled the major depression criteria.  
Personality disorders and also substance abuse are often associated with GAD. In one 
study almost half of the GAD patients qualified as having some type of personality disorder 
(Sanderson & Wetzler, 1991). Grant et al. (2004) conducted a large scale survey that 
comprised of over 43,000 respondents in the United States and found GAD to have a lifetime 
co-morbidity prevalence of 25-35% with drug/alcohol abuse and dependence.  
Research by Schacter, Gilbert, and Wegner (2011) found that the populations most at 
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risk of developing GAD are individuals of low and middle socio-economic status and 
separated, divorced and widowed individuals. There are also gender differences for it is 
around twice as prevalent amongst women as it is amongst men. The authors suggested this 
as being related to the fact that women are reportedly more likely than men to live in poverty 
and to be the victims of discrimination and abuse.  
1.3 Cognitive Theory of GAD 
 1.3.1 Worry. 
Pathological worry is the cardinal feature of GAD (DSM-V) and has much in 
common with rumination, normally associated with depression, as both are characterised by 
repetitive thinking concerning negative self-relevant topics (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). In fact 
a series of factor analyses conducted on questionnaires designed to measure these two 
constructs failed to reveal clear independent underlying factors (Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & 
Craske, 2000). Nevertheless the content of what is labelled as worry and rumination is 
typically different. ‘Worry’ tends to describe thoughts of perceived threat whereas 
‘rumination’ tends to be applied to thoughts of past negative events or of self-criticism 
(Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005).  
Studies have consistently found that people who experience pathological worry as 
part of GAD rate their worry as more pervasive and less controllable than people without 
pathological worry (e.g., Craske, Rapee, Jackel, & Barlow, 1989). Studies comparing the 
content of worry among GAD individuals and non-anxious controls report mixed results. The 
majority of studies have found interpersonal relationships to be the most common domain of 
worry, however this has been found to be the case for both GAD individuals and non-anxious 
individuals alike (e.g., Sanderson & Barlow, 1990). The most consistent findings regarding 
differences in worry content between non-anxious controls and GAD samples have been 
miscellaneous worry topics (e.g., car mechanical issues or arriving late at an appointment). 
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Across three studies, miscellaneous worry topics reported by non-anxious controls accounted 
for between 0% and 20% of all reported worries whereas among individuals diagnosed with 
GAD the proportion of miscellaneous worries was between 25% and 31% (e.g., Borkovec, 
Shadick, & Hopkins, 1991; Craske et al., 1989; Roemer, Molina, & Borkovec, 1997).  
 Whilst it is clear that individuals with GAD worry significantly more than individuals 
without an anxiety disorder (Holaway et al., 2006), it is less clear why it is so difficult for 
individuals with GAD to disengage from worry. Although anticipation of probable danger 
can be adaptive (Beck, 1976), there seems little adaptive value in excessive worry persisting 
for unlikely events causing debilitating distress. As part of an attempt to understand this 
process better, a number of cognitive models of GAD (e.g., Borkovec, 1994; Dugas, Letarte, 
Rheaume, Freestone, & Ladouceur, 1995; Wells, 1995) have emerged since GAD was 
recognised as an independent diagnostic construct. Each of these models focus on important 
aspects of beliefs, attitudes and thought patterns associated with pathological worrying in 
GAD to create idiosyncratic conceptualisations.  
1.3.2 Cognitive models of GAD.  
The Avoidance Model of Worry and GAD (AMW; Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec, 
Alcaine, & Behar, 2004) proposes that worry is a thought-based activity that operates as a 
form of avoidance particularly of emotional processing. As part of this process, distressing 
mental imagery is replaced by less distressing, less somatically intolerable, verbal linguistic 
activity. The model holds that worry is maintained by negative reinforcement and positive 
beliefs about worrying. In terms of empirical backing for the model, there is evidence to 
support worrying being a verbal linguistic process rather than an imagery-based process 
(Behar & Borkovec, 2005). There is also some evidence that finds worrying to have a 
somatic reducing effect (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Borkovec, Lyonfields, Wiser, & Deihl, 1993; 
Peasley-Miklus & Vrana, 2000; Thayer, Friedman, & Borkovec, 1996).   
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 The Intolerance of Uncertainty Model (IUM; Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004; 
Dugas et al., 1995) proposes, as its name suggests, that individuals with GAD are unable to 
tolerate uncertainty very well. Rather, any situation with ambiguity or uncertainty triggers 
chronic worry. Individuals with GAD believe that worrying will help them either cope with 
feared events or stop them from happening in the first place. The IUM proposes that worry 
and the associated emotions results in a negative problem orientation and cognitive 
avoidance, both of which maintain the worry. The model is supported by evidence linking 
GAD with negative problem orientation (Robichaud & Dugas, 2005) and IU (Dugas, 
Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005; Ladouceur et al., 1999).  
Finally, the Metacognitive Model (MCM; Wells, 1995) uniquely includes positive and 
negative beliefs in its explanation of pathological worry. The model distinguishes between 
Type 1 worry – which refers to concern about external and non-cognitive threats and Type 2 
worry or ‘meta worry’ – which is essentially worry about worry. The individual with GAD is 
understood as essentially being locked in a continual conflict between positive and negative 
beliefs about worry. A growing body of evidence supports several aspects of the MCM, for 
example positive and negative beliefs about worry have been found to predict proneness to 
pathological worry (e.g., Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) and distinguish GAD from other 
anxiety disorders (Wells, 2001). Also, Type 2 worry has been found to be a key predictor of 
pathological worry (Wells & Carter, 1999).   
The cognitive models share a common emphasis on the central role that avoiding 
internal experiences plays in the maintenance of worry. For example, the AMW posits that 
worry is a strategy for avoiding uncomfortable emotions, the IUM identifies worry as a 
strategy for avoiding uncertainty and the MCM focuses on individuals engaging in strategies 
aimed at avoiding worrying about worry. However there are also key theoretical differences. 
For the AMW, the crucial factor maintaining pathological worry is its usage as a means of 
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avoiding emotional processing whereas for the MCM and the IUM, metacognitive beliefs 
about worry and an intolerance of uncertainty are the key factors, respectively.  
Furthermore the treatments proposed by each are unique. The therapy protocol 
developed from the AMW involves a variety of different components including the 
identification of and exposure to threatening cues that are habitually avoided, relaxation 
training, cognitive restructuring, and more recently, interpersonal and emotional processing 
(IEP) difficulties (Borkovec, 2006). Interventions derived from the IUM include challenging 
IU by applying problem-solving techniques to addressable worries, altering positive beliefs 
about worry, appreciating the role of IU in worry, using imaginal exposure to deal with core 
beliefs and carrying out behavioural exposure to uncertainty- triggering situations (Robichaud 
& Dugas, 2006). In Metacognitive therapy, derived from the MCM, emphasis is on 
modifying the dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs and reducing usage of worry (Wells, 
2006).  
 1.3.3 Efficacy of cognitive therapy for GAD.  
Despite important conceptual differences in the treatments that have been developed 
from each of the cognitive models they all have common components including psycho-
education, self-monitoring, and a focus on facilitating patients to tolerate uncomfortable 
internal experiences (Behar, DiMarco, Ilyse, Hekler, Mohlman, & Staples, 2009). They can 
all be very broadly described as Cognitive Therapy (CT). In this definition, CT describes a 
class of psychotherapeutic approaches that include cognitive methods, often accompanied 
with behavioural techniques (often referred to as Cognitive Behaviour Therapy; CBT) that 
typically aim to reduce anxiety and worry to a sub-clinical level (Hanrahan, Field, Jones, & 
Davey, 2013). According to Hanrahan et al. (2013), CT interventions can be classified into 
three general categories: (1) Those that try to modify the content of GAD maintaining 
cognitions (e.g., positive and negative beliefs about worry), (2) ‘third wave interventions’ 
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such as mindfulness-based cognitive therapy that aim to promote acceptance of cognitions, 
(3) CT plus other therapeutic components such as emotion-focused and interpersonal therapy 
and motivational interviewing.   
 CT is one of the most widely researched and implemented forms of psychological 
treatment for GAD (Davey, 2008). Meta-analyses have consistently found that CT out 
performs placebo pills, no treatment, waitlist controls and non-directive support therapy as a 
treatment for GAD (Borkovec & Ruscio, 2001; Covin, Ouimet, Seeds, & Dozois, 2008; 
Fisher, 2006; Gould, Safren, Washington, & Otto, 2004; Hanrahan et al., 2013; Norton & 
Price, 2007). Some recent meta-analyses which have emphasised the need to measure 
pathological worry as the key GAD outcome index, have found CT to reduce worry with 
large effect sizes (d = 1.15, Covin et al., 2008; d = 1.81, Hanrahan et al., 2013). There is also 
evidence for CT’s superiority over alternative psychological treatments such as relaxation 
therapies (Borkovec & Ruscio, 2001; Fisher, 2006) and that treatment gains maintain 1 year 
post-therapy (Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004; Fisher, 2006; Gould et al., 2004; Hanrahan et al., 
2013). However evidence for the overall effectiveness of CT in treating pathological worry is 
more limited with the most recent meta-analysis finding that 43% of GAD patients were not 
classified as recovered at 12 months (Hanrahan et al., 2013). Therefore whilst it can be 
confidently said that CT is effective at reducing worry, as Hanrahan et al. (2013) pointed out, 
there is a need to improve CT interventions so that a greater proportion of patients achieve 
recovery. 
1.4 Information Processing Accounts of GAD     
 Whilst cognitive models such as the AMW, MCM, and IUM offer valuable 
frameworks for understanding GAD, the treatment derived from these models, whilst 
effective for many, still have considerable room for improvement (Hanrahan et al., 2013). 
Also, these models offer limited conceptualisations of the function of cognitive biases 
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operating at a deeper level, outside of awareness, which are known to be implicated in GAD 
(Hayes & Hirsch, 2007). Although the AMW acknowledges the role of emotional processing 
in worry, information processing models exist that provide a more comprehensive 
explanation of how selective processing biases operate in this disorder. 
 1.4.1 Information processing models of anxiety. 
 Information processing accounts of anxiety disorders were pioneered by Beck and his 
colleagues (Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985) who proposed that the locus of 
the problem was in maladaptive cognitive structures termed ‘danger schemata’. Beck’s 
schema model (e.g., Beck et al., 1985) proposed that in pathological anxiety, danger 
schemata continually process information about oneself, the world and the future in a 
distorted way as dangerous. Beck considered that this distorted information processing 
produces automatic thoughts and images relevant to danger and associated anxiety. 
 Another early theory influential in this field of information processing was Bower’s 
network theory (Bower, 1981; Bower, Sahgal, & Routh, 1983) which advocated pathological 
anxiety to be the product of over-active anxiety nodes within semantic memory which result 
in the priming of threat related information. Although theoretically different, both models 
concord that individuals with GAD display processing biases of selective attention to 
threatening stimuli, negative interpretation of events and negative memory retrieval. These 
characteristics have tended to accompany other information processing models of anxiety that 
have been developed since (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1997; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Ohman, 1993; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988, 1997). 
 1.4.2 An information processing model of GAD. 
 Hirsch and Mathews (2012) have gone beyond a generic information processing 
theory of emotional disorder and developed a specific cognitive model of pathological worry. 
Unlike prior models of GAD such as the IUM, MCM and AMW, this model elucidates the 
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role of emotional processing biases not only in bringing thoughts into awareness but also 
their continuing impact on the content of worry itself. The central premise of the model is 
that worry arises from an interaction between involuntary (bottom-up) processes (i.e., 
processing biases) and voluntary (top-down) processes (e.g., attentional control).  
 The model suggests that if a worry prone individual experiences an external cue or 
internal reminder of some potential threat, their internal representation of threat activates 
more strongly than non-anxious individuals. This is due to the greater influence of 
involuntary bottom-up processes in worry prone individuals which includes a stronger 
interpretation processing bias. Consequently the worry prone individual’s mental 
representation of whatever task they are trying to engage in (e.g., reading, cooking etc) is 
more strongly inhibited leading to insufficient voluntary top-down control (i.e., poor 
maintained attention for the intended task). Eventually the threat representation gains enough 
strength to intrude into awareness in the form of intrusive thoughts.  
 Over time negative intrusions develop into streams of verbal thoughts about perceived 
threats and this process becomes increasingly habitual. This means intrusions are more likely 
to occur. Once an intrusion enters awareness, other conscious processes are involved. 
Intrusions perceived as troubles to be solved tend to arouse efforts to deal with them taking 
verbal form of ‘what if...?’. Intrusions can also trigger prior worry related content, 
augmenting processing biases leading to increasingly catastrophic thoughts making the task 
of redirecting attention away from them more difficult. Further attentional impairment may 
come from maladaptive beliefs about worry (e.g., that it is uncontrollable or that it is useful). 
The model posits that individuals can become locked in cycles of worry and that this is how 
GAD develops.     
 Like other information processing models previously mentioned (e.g., Beck et al., 
1985; Bower, 1981) the one developed by Hirsch and Mathews (2012) assumes that 
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automatic cognitive biases of attention and interpretation are essential to the development and 
maintenance of clinical anxiety although consistent with more recent findings a specific 
memory bias is not included (for reviews see Coles & Heimberg, 2002; MacLeod & 
Mathews, 2004).  
 In terms of experimental evidence for the model and its assumptions, firstly, the 
existence of a robust association between information processing and anxiety has been firmly 
established for some time (Mathews & Macleod, 2005). It has been consistently demonstrated 
that anxious individuals, including those with GAD (e.g., Martin, Williams, & Clark, 1991), 
display a stronger attentional bias towards threatening stimuli across a variety of 
experimental tasks than do non-anxious controls and that this bias causally relates to anxiety 
(for a review see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Ijzendoom, 2007). 
There is also evidence to support the notion of competition effects between alternative 
processing options, for example task related representations versus threat related 
representations (Duncan, 2006) and between processing biases (Macleod & Mathews, 1991; 
Mogg, Mathews, Eysenck, & May, 1991). A number of findings are consistent with the 
assumption that trait-like poor attentional control is a risk factor for GAD (Bishop, 2009; 
Fales et al., 2008) and that worry makes attentional control worse (Hayes, Hirsch, & 
Mathews, 2008; Leigh & Hirsch, 2011). The effect of maladaptive beliefs on worry is 
consistent with the MCM and supporting evidence (Wells, 2006), although Hirsch and 
Mathews (2012) proposed that such beliefs are more likely post-hoc rationalisations of worry 
rather than causes of worry (see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Consistent with the AMW, there is 
evidence to suggest that worry is predominantly verbal (e.g., Behar & Borkovec, 2005) and 
that it results in increased subsequent negative intrusions (e.g., Butler, Wells, & Dewick, 
1995; Leigh & Hirsch, 2011). In terms of empirical support for the role of interpretation bias 
in GAD as advocated by the cognitive model of pathological worry (Hirsch & Mathews, 
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2012) and other models that came before it (e.g., Beck et al., 1985; Bower, 1981), this will be 
the focus for the next section.    
 1.4.3 Interpretation bias. 
There is evidence to suggest that individuals with GAD have a tendency to interpret 
ambiguous information in a threatening way. It has been shown that when individuals with 
diagnosed GAD were presented with ambiguous scenarios they selected threatening 
interpretations as being more likely to come to mind (Butler & Mathews, 1983) and as being 
more likely to be true (Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991) than non-anxious 
controls. Similarly, individuals with GAD have been found to write down more threat related 
words when presented with ambiguously threatening homophones (words with the same 
sound, but alternative meanings and spellings) (Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 
1991) and to have reported more concern for ambiguous situations (Anderson, Dugas, 
Koerner, Radomsky, Savard, & Turcotte, 2012). Indirect evidence suggestive of the existence 
of a negative interpretive bias in GAD comes from the wealth of studies that have observed 
the bias in individuals with high trait anxiety (e.g., MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; Mogg et al., 
1994; Richards & French, 1992) and other anxiety disorders such as panic (e.g., Pitts & 
McClure, 1967), social phobia (e.g., Derakshan & Eysenk, 1997) and PTSD (Elwood, 
Williams, Olatunji, & Lohr, 2007). In sum there is a strong case for the conclusion that GAD 
is characterised by an interpretive bias that favours negative resolutions of ambiguity 
(MacLeod & Rutherford, 2004).  
1.5 Cognitive Bias Modification-Interpretation (CBM-I) 
 1.5.1 Causal relationship. 
The compelling evidence of an interpretive bias-anxiety link suggests that a negative 
interpretation bias may play a causal role in pathological anxiety development and 
maintenance (MacLeod & Rutherford, 2004). However, these findings cannot rule out the 
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possibility that it is anxiety that contributes to a negative interpretation bias rather than the 
other way round. Examination of the causal nature of biases is not only of theoretical 
importance but is also clinically relevant in terms of designing effective interventions for 
GAD and other anxiety disorders (Salemink, 2008). Indeed psychotherapy interventions 
grounded in cognitive theory rely in large part on the assumption that cognitive biases 
directly impact on symptoms. Researchers have recently started turning their attention to 
interventions targeted at the information processing level (e.g., Grey & Mathews, 2000; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). The aim being to reveal more about the causal contributions 
of cognitive biases on anxiety and to see whether interventions that modify cognitive bias 
ameliorate symptoms in disorders such as GAD (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). 
 1.5.2 Modifying interpretation bias. 
In a series of pioneering experiments, Grey and Mathews (2000) investigated whether 
an interpretive bias could be induced in low trait anxious volunteers. Participants were first 
presented with homographs that had one positive and one negative meaning (e.g., batter). On 
every trial the homograph was followed by a word fragment that required quick completion. 
The completed word always related to a meaning of the homograph which consequently 
could be a useful aid to such completion. In the group designed to induce a negative 
interpretation bias the completed defragmented word always corresponded to a negative 
meaning of the homograph e.g. ‘a s s - - l t’ (assault) whereas in the other group designed to 
induce a more positive interpretation bias, the completed word corresponded to a more 
positive meaning of the homograph e.g. ‘p - n c - k e’ (pancake). After participants had 
completed up to 240 trials of this, the induced pattern of interpretative selectivity was 
assessed by inspecting solution times for defragmenting the target words. The results 
revealed that participants in the positive interpretive condition demonstrated more benign 
interpretations of ambiguity than did those in the negative interpretive condition.  
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In an attempt to provide material more relevant to everyday concerns, Mathews and 
Mackintosh (2000) employed short passages of text describing ambiguous situations relevant 
to social anxiety. In their classic study, volunteers were required to read and imagine 
themselves in about 100 social scenarios (training) that had either a positive or a negative 
outcome. In the first experiment, at the end of each scenario, participants were required to 
solve a word fragment that always concluded the scenario in a positive or negative way 
depending on the group assignment. They were then immediately presented with a 
‘comprehension question’ that required a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer that was congruent with the 
imposed emotional valence of the scenario. The results revealed that participants who 
experienced negatively resolved scenarios in the training phase gave higher recognition 
ratings to threatening interpretations in a subsequent recognition task than did the participants 
who received positively resolved scenarios. Thus, repeatedly restricting participants to 
endorse either positive or negative interpretations resulted in a measurable induced bias. In 
addition, participants in the positive interpretation trained group reported a decrease in state 
anxiety whereas those in the negative interpretation trained group reported an increase. 
Training participants to interpret information according to a prescribed emotional valence 
was termed Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation (CBM-I) and has been the subject 
of much investigation since. 
Subsequent research has replicated the effects of CBM-I training on interpretation 
biases. For example, Hertel, Mathews, Peterson, and Kintner (2003) presented non-anxious 
college students with a homograph task and found that the number of threat related 
interpretations in a later transfer task significantly increased if participants had experienced 
threat related interpretation training as opposed to other training conditions. Other studies 
adopting Mathews and Mackintosh’s (2000) CBM-I paradigm (Yiend, Mackintosh, & 
Mathews, 2005; Salemink, van de Hout, & Kindt, 2007a) using non-anxious volunteers have 
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observed training congruent effects for interpretation bias.  
Interestingly, Salemink, van de Hout, and Kindt (2007b) found that participants in the 
positive interpretive condition, but not the negative interpretive condition, reported a 
significant decrease in state and trait anxiety. In a mediational analysis, the researchers 
(Salmink, van de Hout, & Kindt, 2010) demonstrated that reductions in state anxiety seemed 
to be directly caused by the CBM-I procedure, but that the reductions in trait anxiety seemed 
to be due to changes in interpretation bias. This finding supports the hypothesis that 
interpretation biases causally relate to anxiety vulnerability.  
To exclude the possibility that the reductions in trait anxiety were exclusive to 
interpretations relating to past experiences rather than anxiety vulnerability generally, 
Salemink et al. (2007a) investigated whether CBM-I could impact upon emotional reactivity 
in a subsequent anagram task designed to induce stress and raise anxiety. The researchers 
failed to observe an effect of earlier CBM-I training on trait anxiety with the inclusion of this 
stressor. However the researchers pointed out that the anagram stressor may have involved 
insufficient ambiguity for differences in interpretive bias to influence anxiety responses, 
thereby making conclusions difficult.  
In support, evidence for the causal role of interpretation bias on anxiety vulnerability 
has come from other stressors that lend themselves to less ambiguous emotional 
interpretations. Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, and Rutherford (2006) exposed undergraduate 
students to brief video clips of real life emergency situations in which a protagonist is injured 
but eventually rescued. The researchers found that participants who had received negative 
CBM-I training previously experienced elevated anxiety in response to the video clip whereas 
those who had received positive CBM-I previously were not significantly affected during the 
video clip.  
CBM-I training effects have also been observed in children and adolescents. For 
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example, in a sample of healthy adolescents (aged 13-17 years), Lothmann, Holmes, Chan, 
and Lau (2011) found that adolescents who received negative training went on to make a 
greater proportion of negative interpretations compared to adolescents who had received 
positive training. Furthermore positive training was associated with a decrease in negative 
affect.  
 1.5.3 Summary of CBM-I in non-anxious samples. 
These studies, carried out using non-anxious samples provide clear support for the 
hypothesis that interpretation biases causally contribute to variations in anxiety vulnerability. 
However this does not necessarily mean that such interpretation biases are causally 
implicated in the types of abnormal experiences associated with anxiety disorders such as 
GAD. Evidence that CBM-I could ameliorate symptoms of pathological anxiety would 
require testing in clinical populations.  
1.6 Literature Review of CBM-I Research with Anxious Samples 
Whilst CBM-I is associated with improvements in interpretation bias and anxiety, 
until relatively recently few studies had investigated its efficacy in anxious populations 
(Beard, 2011). The aim of the literature search is to explore the effectiveness of CBM-I for 
individuals presenting with anxiety both at clinical and non-clinical levels.  
 1.6.1 Search strategy. 
 The primary phase involved using the Metalib online database to search eight 
computerised databases (AMED, Cochrane Library, EBSCO, EMBASE, ERIC, psychINFO, 
Science Direct & MEDLINE). An initial search was performed using the search terms ‘anx*’ 
OR ‘worry’ (n=217998). A second search then refined the results using the terms ‘cognitive 
bias modification’ OR ‘CBM*’ OR ‘bias modification’ OR ‘bias training’ (n=234). At this 
stage eight articles were identified as suitable. The same key terms were also entered into the 
University of East Anglia’s ‘Primo One Search’ digital repository resulting in four new 
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suitable articles. Prominent authors in the field (Amir, N., Beard, C., Hirsch, C.R., Holmes, 
E.A., Mackintosh, B., MacLeod, C., Mathews, A., & Salemink, E) were subject to further 
searching in the databases as well as in Google, yielding two new suitable articles. Finally the 
reference sections from the selected papers and three relatively recent CBM review papers 
(Beard, 2011; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012) were hand searched and 
no new articles were found.    
 1.6.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
All studies which investigated the effect of interpretation modification procedures 
(e.g., CBM-I) on anxiety symptoms or worry in anxious selected adult samples were eligible 
for inclusion.  
A study was immediately excluded if it was not published in a peer reviewed journal 
in the English language. If a study had a selected sample of participants with diagnoses that 
were not an anxiety disorder, such as Schizophrenia, it was not included. The rationale was 
that the cognitive biases that contribute to those disorders may differ in important ways from 
those that contribute to GAD (e.g., Garcia, Sacks, & Weisman de Mamani, 2012).  
 1.6.3 Review of selected studies. 
 A total of 14 suitable studies were identified. A descriptive outline is presented in 
Table 1.  
 Using a similar CBM-I paradigm to that of Mathews and Mackintosh (2000), Murphy, 
Hirsch, Mathews, Smith, and Clark (2007) investigated whether a benign interpretation bias 
could be experimentally induced in socially anxious individuals. Participants were allocated 
to either a benign condition in which they had repeated practice at accessing positive or non-
negative interpretations, or a neutral control condition in which they were presented with the 
same scenarios but without outcomes specified. The researchers found that participants 
trained to make benign interpretations of threat related scenarios made less negative 
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interpretations of new ambiguous scenarios than control participants. They also found that 
benign trained participants rated their anxiety for a future social situation as significantly 
lower compared to controls, although no differences in state anxiety were observed. This 
study showed for the first time that the positive effects of CBM-I demonstrated by Mathews 
and Mackintosh could be extended to a socially anxious population. Other studies since, 
using socially anxious individuals, have reported similar findings, for example Amir, 
Bomyea, and Beard (2010) found that participants assigned to a single session of an 
interpretation modification program (IMP) demonstrated reduced interpretation bias 
compared to participants assigned to an interpretation control condition (ICC).  
 While interpretation bias modification procedures have mainly targeted social anxiety 
(Beard, 2011), positive effects using a single session of Mathews and Mackintosh’s CBM-I 
training paradigm have also been demonstrated in individuals high in anxiety sensitivity 
(AS). Steinman and Teachman (2010) trained participants to imagine themselves in scenarios 
relating to AS and found that positive training resulted in reduced negative interpretations 
and self reported symptoms of AS compared to control conditions. However this study failed 
to find an expected significant effect of positive training on emotional vulnerability. One 
possible explanation for this put forward by the researchers was that the amount of training 
participants received was not substantial enough to allow effects to emerge.  
 Likewise, Macdonald, Koerner, and Antony (2013) examined the impact of a single 
session of CBM-I on individuals high in AS and they too found that not all of their 
hypotheses were supported. Although only CBM-I trained participants demonstrated a 
significant decrease in AS, the difference was not significantly different to that observed in 
control participants. Furthermore CBM-I did not increase tolerance for uncomfortable 
sensations. Macdonald and colleagues questioned whether their control condition was more 
active than intended but they also shared the concerns of Steinman and Teachman (2010) that 
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a single session of CBM-I may be insufficient.    
 To investigate whether increasing the amount of CBM-I produces enhanced 
outcomes, studies have increasingly included multi-session CBM-I interventions. Beard and 
Amir (2008) provided socially anxious participants with eight sessions of their IMP that took 
place over a four week period. Compared to participants in a control condition, participants 
who completed the IMP endorsed more benign interpretations and fewer threat 
interpretations, and demonstrated a greater reduction in social anxiety symptoms. 
Furthermore these changes were observed up to one week after training.  
 To explore the durability of positive effects associated with CBM-I, some studies 
have included an actual follow-up assessment. Bowler, Mackintosh, Dunn, Mathews, 
Dalgleish, and Hoppitt (2012) found that socially anxious students who received four 
sessions of CBM-I demonstrated reduced levels of social anxiety and trait anxiety two weeks 
after their first session compared to participants who did not receive any intervention. 
Interestingly this study also included a computerised CBT (cCBT) intervention and found no 
superiority of either intervention, although CBM-I was more effective at reducing 
interpretative bias. Whilst the study by Bowler et al. (2012) is not clear on how long the 
improvements lasted upon completion of the training, Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, and Yiend 
(2007) measured trait anxiety in high trait anxious participants one week after they had 
completed their fourth and final session of CBM-I and found it to be reduced compared to 
untrained controls. Whilst CBM-I training was also associated with more positive 
interpretations after the final session, this outcome was not assessed at follow-up.  
 The large majority of CBM-I studies have involved participants receiving CBM-I type 
procedures in a laboratory or some form of test centre (Beard, 2011). Given the experimental 
nature of CBM-I research, this is to be expected however it offers limited insight into how 
well CBM-I performs in more naturalistic settings. An exception to this is the study by 
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Salemink, van de Hout, and Kindt (2009) in which high trait anxious participants accessed 
CBM-I training over the internet from their home. Not only was this study novel in the way 
CBM-I was provided but also novel in its intensity as training consisted of eight sessions that 
took place on consecutive days lasting approximately one hour each. Another advantageous 
aspect to this study was that the control group included training which was designed to be 
non-contingent (i.e., a sham). This is in contrast with, for instance, the study by Mathews et 
al. (2007) in which control participants received no training at all thereby undermining 
confidence that effects observed in the experimental group are due to the CBM-I training and 
not other confounding features of repeated training. Although their findings on social anxiety 
were equivocal, Salemink and colleagues found that their online CBM-I was successful in 
modifying interpretations and reducing state and trait anxiety. This study did not include any 
follow-up nevertheless in the context of CBM-I potentially having a use one day as a home-
based therapeutic adjunct (Beard, 2011) these findings hold increased ecological validity.  
 All of the reviewed studies so far have consisted of non-clinical samples and many of 
them students (Beard & Amir, 2008; Bowler et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2007; Salemink et 
al., 2009; Steinman & Teachman, 2010). One limitation with this common over reliance on 
testing students is that it undermines the generalisability of the CBM-I findings to the general 
population. A further limitation is that their symptoms are unlikely to be as severe as those 
found in clinical populations. Consequently it is less clear how effective CBM-I is for 
individuals with more deeply entrenched biases and anxiety disorders such as GAD.  
 Two randomised double-blind placebo controlled trials have tested multi-session bias 
modification tasks in individuals meeting DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for social anxiety 
disorder (SAD) (Amir & Taylor, 2012a; Beard, Weisberg, & Amir, 2011). Beard et al. (2011) 
delivered a combined CBM-I and CBM-A multi-session package called Attention and 
Interpretation Modification (AIM). The interpretation module involved completing a word 
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sentence association task whereby the pairing of benign word sentences resulted in positive 
feedback for the participants whereas the pairing of negative word sentences resulted in 
negative feedback. Compared to controls, participants in the AIM condition experienced a 
significant reduction in social anxiety symptoms and gave higher quality impromptu 
speeches, to medium and large effect respectively.  
 In the study by Amir and Taylor (2012a), participants who received the IMP made 
interpretations that were less threatening and more benign relative to sham trained 
participants in the control group. Moreover IMP participants displayed larger reductions in 
clinician rated social anxiety symptoms and functional impairment as well as self reported 
trait anxiety relative to the control group. Of the participants that completed the IMP, 56% no 
longer met diagnostic criteria for SAD compared to 13% in the control group.    
 SAD is the most common anxiety disorder featuring in studies investigating CBM-I 
(Beard, 2011) and the reviewed studies indicate that it is amenable to interpretation bias 
modification (e.g., Amir et al., 2010) and symptom reduction (Beard & Amir, 2008; Bowler 
et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2007). Nevertheless some studies have set out to examine the 
potential efficacy of CBM-I for GAD.  
 Hirsch, Hayes, and Mathews (2009) provided non-clinical high worriers with either 
CBM-I or a sham analogue. CBM-I trained participants went on to report fewer negative 
thought intrusions and lower levels of anxiety during a breathing focus task compared to 
controls. This suggests that CBM-I can enable worriers to have more effective control over 
their worry and experience less concomitant anxiety as a result. While these findings are 
encouraging, the study also had some limitations, mainly: that its ‘worriers’ were voluntary 
university staff and students, that it did not measure interpretation bias change and that the 
CBM-I intervention consisted of two types of tasks (homograph and ambiguous scenarios). 
As the authors note, the dual task approach makes it difficult to establish whether the 
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outcomes are attributable to either task or both in combination thereby precluding evaluations 
of each. 
 Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, and Mathews (2010) addressed some of these issues by 
conducting a similar study using 40 patients who were in treatment for GAD. Trained 
participants made less negative interpretations of ambiguous scenarios on a later sentence 
completion task than controls and experienced fewer negative intrusions during the breathing 
focus task. However, the CBM-I intervention still consisted of dual tasks raising the same 
issues as in Hirsch et al. (2009) and the CBM-I intervention was brief, comprising only of a 
single session. Nevertheless, with these potential drawbacks considered, the study does 
suggest that it is possible to modify interpretive bias and worry in patients with GAD.  
 Only one other CBM-I study to date has selected individuals with GAD. Brosan, 
Hoppitt, Shelfer, Sillence, and Mackintosh (2011) administered multi-session bias 
modification training to 13 patients with diagnoses of either SAD or GAD who had been 
referred to an outpatient psychological treatment service for cognitive therapy. Upon 
completion of training, participants demonstrated a reduction in threat related interpretive 
bias and this change was accompanied by reduced trait and state anxiety. It is important to 
note that the adopted modification procedure was a combined CBM-A and CBM-I package 
designed to target attention and interpretation biases which like some other studies reviewed 
(Amir et al., 2010; Beard et al., 2011) means that it is not possible to distinguish the 
independent contribution of CBM-I on the outcomes. Furthermore no control feature was 
included and, similar to Hayes et al. (2010), there was no follow-up. 
 1.6.3.1 Theoretical implications. 
 The resounding success of the various bias modification procedures, adopted by the 
reviewed studies in producing improvements on bias assessment tasks, supports the notion 
that CBM-I training can induce a more benign interpretive bias. The fact that in some studies 
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training also improved symptomatology (Amir & Taylor, 2012a; Brosan et al., 2011; Hayes 
et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2009; Mathews et al., 2007; Salemink et al., 2009) lends support to 
cognitive models (e.g., Hirsch & Mathews, 2012) that negative interpretive biases contribute 
to anxiety dysfunction.      
 However the unexpected improvements observed in some sham trained participants 
(Beard & Amir, 2008; MacDonald et al., 2013; Murphy et al., 2007) raises the possibility that 
non-specific aspects of training (i.e., unrelated to bias modification) such as exposure to 
valenced material may be responsible for improvement (Salemink et al., 2010). This may be 
more the case for state anxiety than trait anxiety (Salemink et al., 2010).  
 Mediational analyses conducted in the reviewed studies tended to find that CBM-I 
affected outcomes via bias modification (Amir & Taylor, 2012a; Beard & Amir, 2008; 
Bowler et al., 2012). Further evidence that interpretation bias modification is the primary 
mechanism of change of CBM-I training comes from the fact that some of the studies which 
incorporated independent measures of bias change did detect change (e.g., Hayes et al., 2010; 
Mathews et al., 2007). These findings indicate that CBM-I does not simply create a response 
bias consistent with the training condition but produces genuine, generalisable cognitive 
change. 
 1.6.4 Summary critique of overall findings. 
 All of the studies reviewed found that participants who completed CBM-I type 
training demonstrated significantly less negative interpretation bias (where measured) post 
intervention compared to pre-intervention. Some of the studies also found that training 
positively impacted on anxiety (Amir & Taylor, 2012a; Brosan et al., 2011; Mathews et al., 
2007; Salemink et al., 2009) and worry (Hayes et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2009). Furthermore 
mediation analyses support CBM-I as an effective method of change (Amir & Taylor, 2012a; 
Beard & Amir, 2008; Bowler et al., 2012). However there are some limitations within the 
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research base that warrant consideration when evaluating the efficacy of CBM-I as a potential 
treatment for individuals with GAD.   
Findings regarding the effect of CBM-I on anxiety and related emotional outcomes 
were more mixed than was the case for interpretive bias change. Some studies found no 
difference between CBM-I trained participants and sham trained controls (Amir et al., 2010; 
Beard & Amir., 2008; MacDonald et al., 2013; Murphy et al., 2007; Steinman & Teachman, 
2010) and in some cases controls even improved (Beard & Amir., 2008; MacDonald et al., 
2013; Murphy et al., 2007). This makes it more difficult to discount non-bias related 
explanations of training effects.  
With many of the studies relying on single session CBM-I interventions despite 
acknowledging multi-session as the ideal (e.g., MacDonald et al., 2013; Steinman & 
Teachman, 2010), it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions regarding the optimum number 
of sessions or time frame over which they should occur. Given the robustness of information 
processing biases (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012) it is conceivable that multi-session might stand 
a better chance than a single session in bringing about enduring cognitive change. 
Although CBM-I appears to be generally successful in producing quick improvements 
in outcomes, a limitation cited by the researchers in over half of the studies was their absence 
of a follow-up (e.g., Hirsch et al., 2009; MacDonald et al., 2013; Steinman & Teachman, 
2010). Of the four studies that did include one, only three measured anxiety symptoms a 
week or more later (Amir & Taylor, 2012a; Bowler et al., 2012; Mathews et al., 2007). The 
longest follow-up took place three months after participants had completed training (Amir & 
Taylor, 2012a) and in this study treatment gains at post intervention had lasted. The lack of  
follow-ups makes it difficult to appraise the effects of CBM-I on interpretation biases and 
anxiety symptoms beyond the moments immediately following completion of training.  
Regarding the samples used in the studies, few consisted of participants assessed as 
  
24 
 
experiencing clinical levels of an anxiety disorder (Amir & Taylor, 2012a; Beard et al., 2011; 
Brosan et al., 2011; Hayes et al., 2010) and many consisted of students (Beard & Amir, 2008; 
Bowler et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2007; Salemink et al., 2009; Steinman & Teachman, 
2010) undermining the generalisability of the findings.  
Despite CBM-I being widely hailed as a potential home-based treatment (Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007; Beard, 2011), only two of the studies tested it in this setting (Brosan et al., 2011; 
Salemink et al., 2009). The preponderance of laboratory tested training protocols makes it 
more difficult to appraise the clinical application of CBM-I.   
Finally, only two studies tested CBM-I on individuals with GAD (Brosan et al., 2011; 
Hayes et al., 2010) although Brosan et al. (2011) administered a combined CBM-I/CBM-A 
treatment package and neither study included a follow-up.       
 The reviewed studies generally support the cognitive theoretical position that 
interpretation bias causally contributes to dysfunctional anxiety as seen in anxiety disorders 
such as GAD. They also support the hypothesis that CBM-I attenuates symptoms via 
interpretation bias adjustment.   
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Table 1 
Studies which met Inclusion Criteria for Literature Search 
Number Authors Aim Participants Design Outcome Measures Main Findings 
1 Amir, 
Bomyea, and 
Beard (2010). 
 
To examine whether a 
computerised IMP can 
be used to modify 
attentional bias (and 
interpretation bias) in 
individuals high in 
social anxiety. 
 
57 socially 
anxious 
individuals 
(score > 25 on 
the LSAS-SR). 
Between 
subjects 
design. 
 
STAI, 
Interpretation test. 
Participants who had completed 
the IMP demonstrated less 
interpretation bias than controls.  
 
 
 
2 Amir and 
Taylor 
(2012a). 
To examine the 
efficacy of a multi-
session computerised 
IMP in the treatment 
of GSAD. 
 
 
 
 
49 individuals 
that met GSAD 
criteria. 
Clinical sample. 
Between 
subjects 
design 
(double-
blind).  
LSAS, SPAI, SDS, 
STAI, BDI-II. 
The IMP group demonstrated 
decreased threat interpretations 
and increased benign 
interpretations relative to control 
group. 
 
The IMP group displayed larger 
reductions in social anxiety 
symptoms and trait anxiety 
compared to the control group.   
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3 Beard and 
Amir (2008). 
To examine the effect 
of a computerised 
IMP on interpretation 
bias and social anxiety 
symptoms.  
27 socially 
anxious students 
(score > 91 on 
the SPAI-SP).  
Between 
subjects 
design. 
SPAI, STAI, BDI-
II.   
The IMP group endorsed more 
benign interpretations and fewer 
threat interpretations at post 
assessment than the control group. 
  
The IMP group were less socially 
anxious compared to the control 
group at post assessment.     
 
4 Beard, 
Weisberg, 
and Amir 
(2011). 
To examine the 
efficacy of a CBM 
programme designed 
to modify attention 
and interpretive biases 
(AIM) in SAD. 
32 socially 
anxious 
individuals 
(score > 29 on 
the LSAS-SR).  
Clinical sample. 
Between 
subjects 
design 
(double-
blind).  
LSAS-SR, PRF (in 
relation to an 
impromptu 
speech), 
Credibility, 
Acceptability, 
Satisfaction 
questionnaires.   
 
 
 
 
Participants in the AIM condition 
experienced a significant reduction 
in social anxiety symptoms and 
gave higher quality impromptu 
speeches compared to controls. 
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5 Bowler, 
Mackintosh, 
Dunn, 
Mathews, 
Dalgleish, 
and Hoppitt 
(2012). 
To compare the 
efficacy of cCBT and 
CBM-I in alleviating 
social anxiety. 
63 socially 
anxious students 
(score >16 on 
the FNE).  
Between 
subjects 
design. 
FNE, SPIN, STAI, 
BDI-II, ASSIQ, 
SST. 
Both the CBM-I and cCBT group 
reported reduced levels of social 
anxiety, trait anxiety and 
depression compared to a control 
group. 
 
CBM-I was more effective than 
cCBT at reducing interpretation 
bias. 
 
6 Brosan, 
Hoppitt, 
Shelfer, 
Sillence, and 
Mackintosh 
(2011). 
A pilot test of the 
effectiveness and 
acceptability of a 
combined package of 
CBM-A (attention) 
and CBM-I for 
individuals with 
clinical anxiety.  
13 patients 
referred to a 
psychological 
treatment 
service with a 
diagnosis of 
either SAD or 
GAD.     
Clinical sample. 
 
AB design.  STAI, Word 
relatedness test.  
 
Training was associated with 
reductions in interpretation bias, 
state and trait anxiety.      
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7 Clerkin and 
Teachman 
(2011). 
To test the causal 
relationship between 
negative 
interpretations of 
intrusive thoughts and 
distress in OCD.  
100 students 
high in OCD 
symptoms 
(score >28.01 on 
OCI-R).  
Between 
subjects 
design. 
III, PANAS, OBQ, 
Recognition task, 
OCD stressor- 
neutralising urge 
ratings. 
Trained participants endorsed 
more adaptive and fewer 
unadaptive OCD related 
interpretations and beliefs 
compared to controls.      
 
Training was associated with 
reductions in some but not all 
aspects of subsequent emotional 
vulnerability to a stressor. 
 
8 Hayes, 
Hirsch, 
Krebs, and 
Mathews 
(2010). 
 
To investigate 
whether facilitating a 
benign interpretive 
bias decreases 
negative thought 
intrusions in GAD. 
40 GAD patients 
currently in 
treatment.  
Clinical sample. 
Between 
subjects 
design. 
Worry ratings, 
Thought intrusion 
ratings, Sentence 
completions, Mood 
ratings. 
Trained participants made less 
negative interpretations of 
emotionally ambiguous test 
scenarios in training and during a 
later sentence completion task than 
did controls.  
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9 Hirsch, 
Hayes, and 
Mathews 
(2009). 
To investigate 
whether increasing 
access to benign 
outcomes of 
ambiguous events 
decreases worry. 
40 high worry 
volunteers 
(score >55 on 
the PSWQ). 
Between 
subjects 
design. 
Mood rating 
scales, Thought 
intrusion ratings. 
Trained participants reported fewer 
negative thought intrusions during 
a breathing focus task than did 
controls.         
 
Trained participants reported lower 
levels of anxiety during breathing 
focus periods in comparison with 
controls. 
 
10 MacDonald, 
Koerner, and 
Antony 
(2013). 
To examine the 
impact of 
interpretation training 
on AS, interpretive 
biases and reactions to 
bodily sensations. 
34 participants 
high in AS 
(scoring >27 on 
the ASI). 
Between 
subjects 
design. 
MINI, ASI, 
BBSIQ, VAS 
(fear), Time 
tolerated and 
desire to terminate 
a symptom 
induction exercise 
(VAS), Word 
sentence 
association task. 
 
Only trained participants reported 
decreases in overall AS however 
there were no between-group 
differences with controls.        
 
Trained participants and controls 
demonstrated more adaptive 
beliefs regarding sensations.                            
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11 Mathews, 
Ridgeway, 
Cook, and 
Yiend (2007). 
To investigate 
whether modifying 
interpretation biases 
produces congruent 
changes in emotional 
vulnerability. 
 
40 high anxious 
volunteers 
(scoring >40 on 
the trait scale of 
the STAI). 
Between 
subjects 
design. 
STAI, Reasons for 
ambiguous events, 
Imagined 
ambiguous events. 
Trained participants demonstrated 
greater positive change in 
interpretation bias and trait anxiety 
scores compared to untrained 
controls.  
 
12 Murphy, 
Hirsch, 
Mathews, 
Smith, and 
Clark (2007). 
To facilitate a benign 
interpretation bias in 
high socially anxious 
individuals. 
66 socially 
anxious 
participants 
(score > 16 on 
the FNE). 
Between 
subjects 
design. 
STAI, Anticipated 
anxiety and 
predicted 
performance 
ratings forms, 
Recognition test. 
Trained participants demonstrated 
less negative interpretation bias 
than controls.         
 
Trained participants rated their 
anticipated anxiety in an upcoming 
social situation as significantly 
lower compared to controls.  
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13 Salemink, 
van de Hout, 
and Kindt 
(2009). 
To investigate 
whether it is possible 
to modify the negative 
interpretive bias in 
highly anxious 
individuals and 
evaluate what benefit 
this has on certain 
clinical outcomes. 
36 highly trait-
anxious 
participants 
(score > 44 on 
the trait scale of 
the STAI & a 
score > 1.56 on 
the ASSIQ).  
Between 
subjects 
design. 
STAI, FNE, SCL-
90, Pleasure and 
arousal subscale of 
the SAM, VAS, 
ASSIQ, 
Recognition test, 
Reaction time 
solving word 
fragments.  
 
Trained participants showed 
reduced state and trait anxiety 
compared to the control group.   
                             
Trained participants scored lower 
on general psychopathology.                         
14 Steinman and 
Teachman 
(2010). 
To examine the causal 
relationship between 
cognitive biases and 
anxiety. 
75 students high 
on anxiety 
sensitivity 
(score > 27.4 on 
the ASI). 
Between 
subjects 
design. 
PANAS, BBSIQ, 
ASI, Recognition 
test, SIQ. 
Trained participants showed less 
negative bias and less AS 
compared to controls. 
 
Note. STAI = The State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970); SAD =  Social Anxiety Disorder; SDS = Sheehan 
Disability Scale (Leon, Olfson, Portera, Farber, & Sheehan, 1997); AIM = Attention and Interpretation Modification; GAD = Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder; GSAD = Generalized Social Anxiety Disorder; cCBT = Computerised cognitive behavioural therapy; AS = Anxiety 
Sensitivity; PRF = Performance Rating Form; IMP = Interpretation Modification Program; SST = Scrambled Sentences Test (Wenzlaff, 1993); 
MINI = The Mini Neuropsychiatric Interview (Sheehan, Lecrubier, Sheehan, Amorium, Janavs, & Weiller, 1998); OCI-R = Obsessive 
Compulsive Inventory- Revised (Foa et al., 2002); III = The Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working 
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Group, 2003); OBQ = The Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire- Short Form (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2005); ASSIQ = 
Ambiguous Social Situation Interpretation Questionnaire (Stopa & Clark, 2000); FNE = Fear of Negative Evaluation Questionnaire (Watson & 
Friend, 1969); SCL-90 = Symptom Check List (Arrindell & Ettema, 1986); SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin (Hodes, Cook, & Lang, 1985); 
ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986); PANAS = The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson & 
Clark, 1994); BBSIQ = The Brief Body Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire (Clark et al., 1997); SPAI-SP = Social Phobia and Anxiety 
Inventory- Social Phobia Subscale (Turner, Stanley, Beidel, & Bond, 1989); BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory- 2nd Edition (Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996); LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale-Self-Report score (Liebowitz, 1987); PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
(Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). 
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1.7 Modification of Imagery 
 Whilst CBM-I methods are proving effective at modifying biases and often anxiety, 
the optimal ingredients are yet to be identified. In a quest to enhance the efficacy of CBM-I 
as an intervention for emotional dysfunction, some researchers have targeted mental 
imagery (see Holmes & Mathews, 2010).  
 There has been a long held assumption that imagery and anxiety share a special 
relationship (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). Imagery can powerfully provoke emotional states 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2010) and this has resulted in a range of therapeutic approaches 
being developed that incorporate the manipulation of mental imagery. For example, in 
systematic desensitisation of phobias, individuals are repeatedly directed to imagine feared 
objects until anxiety subsides (Wolpe, 1958). Another technique, ‘imagery re-scripting’ 
involves modifying the content of emotionally inducing imagery and has been used in 
treatment for varying disorders (e.g., Arntz & Weertman, 1999). 
 Imagery features in many CBM-I procedures. Studies that replicate Mathews and 
Mackintosh’s (2000) ambiguous scenario paradigm instruct participants to imagine 
themselves in the scenarios presented to them (e.g., Mathews et al., 2007; Murphy et al., 
2007). Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) showed that active generation of meaning was 
essential in bringing about emotional change and Mathews and MacLeod (2002) proposed 
that imagery might be the key mechanism by which this generation has an effect.  
 It is interesting, as Holmes, Lang, and Shah. (2009) point out, that there is no 
mention of imagery in the CBM-I procedure of Salemink et al. (2007) and that only 
marginal effects on emotional outcomes were found in this study. Similarly there is no 
reporting of imagery instructions in the CBM-I procedure administered by Hirsch, 
Mathews, and Clark (2007) and they failed to find any anxiety reduction over training. 
However, when the participants in this study were required to imagine ambiguous items 
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and report on anticipated anxiety to imagined social stress, training congruent effects were 
then observed.  
 Recently there has been an increased focus on imagery within CBM-I tasks to see if 
it makes training more potent. Holmes and Mathews (2005) compared outcomes for 
imagery and verbal processing instructions within a CBM-I task. In the first experiment, 
participants either imagined negative scenarios or listened to descriptions of them while 
thinking about their meaning in verbal terms. The results showed that participants in the 
imaginary condition felt more anxious and rated new ambiguous test descriptions as more 
emotional than participants in the verbal condition. In a second experiment, participants 
listened to either benign or unpleasant descriptions and were provided with either imagery 
or verbal instructions. The researchers found that again, anxiety increased more after 
unpleasant imagery (but not benign) than after verbal processing but that there were no 
differences between the groups on emotional ratings for new ambiguous scenarios after a 
ten minute filler task. Overall, the findings of the two experiments supported the 
hypothesis that imagery of negative material has a stronger effect on anxiety than verbal 
processing. However the failure to find differences between imagery and verbal processing 
in the benign training condition was attributed to these scenarios not being particularly 
positive.   
Consequently Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, and Mackintosh (2006) compared 
interpretation training using imagery versus verbal processing of descriptions that were 
resolved in a more overtly positive way. Participants in the imagery condition experienced 
a reduction in state anxiety and rated new descriptions as being more positive than those in 
the verbal condition. The finding suggests that positive imagery can enhance the ability of  
CBM-I to effect change.  
Holmes et al. (2009) replicated the benefits of imagery-focused training compared 
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with verbal-focused training using a larger sample. Within the imagery condition alone 
there were improvements in positive affect and state anxiety compared with baseline. In 
contrast, positive CBM-I with verbal instructions led not only to a lack of improvement in 
mood but also an actual increase in anxiety over the training phase. The researchers 
concluded that imagery can play a critical role in CBM-I procedures and that task 
instructions are crucial.  
The superiority of imagery versus verbal processing in training positive 
interpretation has also been found in clinically depressed samples. Blackwell and Holmes 
(2010) conducted a single-case series examining an imagery-focussed CBM-I task. Seven 
participants experiencing a major depressive episode completed a ‘baseline’ week in which 
daily measures of mood and cognitive bias took place, and then an ‘intervention’ week in 
which one session of CBM-I was completed each day at home. Large effect sizes were 
found for depressive symptomatology (of which improvements remained at a two week 
follow-up), interpretation bias and general mental health.  
In a follow-up study (Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison, & Holmes, 2012), twenty 
six depressed participants were randomised to either a positive imagery-focussed CBM-I 
condition or a closely matched control condition. Participants in the positive imagery-
focussed condition demonstrated greater improvements in depressive symptomatology, 
intrusive images and cognitive bias than those in the control condition.  
Holmes et al. (2009) proposed that mental imagery can have greater effects on 
positive emotion than verbal processing of the same material. They argued that imagery 
has perceptual correspondence to direct sensory experience ‘as if’ it were really happening 
(Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001). By mimicking real life perceptions, engaging in 
imagery can enhance access to representations of emotionally congruent autobiographical 
memories (Conway, 2001) and thereby activate emotional effects. In contrast, the 
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researchers argued that positive verbal information may be less believable and more easily 
contrastable with other disconfirmatory information in semantic networks. They pointed 
out that this may be advantageous in other domains, for example debating, but not so in 
feeling less anxious when presented with positive information.  
Holmes et al. (2009) also suggested that verbal processing of positive material may 
even maintain worry. Hayes and Gifford (1997) proposed that trying to avoid negative 
affect through the use of verbal language simply results in delayed and more severe 
negative affect later. As discussed already, cognitive models propose that thinking about 
potential threat in a verbal form is a contributory factor in pathological worry and GAD 
(e.g., Borkovec, 1994; Hirch & Mathews, 2012). Indeed there is evidence that individuals 
with GAD display a more pronounced deficit of imagery during worry than non-anxious 
individuals (e.g., Hirsch, Hayes, Mathews, Perman, & Borkovec, 2012). 
In sum, the prevailing opinion of the literature base concerning imagery and bias 
modification is that CBM-I procedures that target mental imagery should achieve better 
anxiety related outcomes.  
1.8 Aims of the Current Study 
Only two studies to date have tested CBM-I in GAD samples (Brosan et al., 2011; 
Hayes et al., 2010) and promisingly it was found that CBM-I trained participants 
demonstrated reduced interpretation bias, anxiety (Brosan et al., 2011) and worry (Hayes et 
al., 2010). The present study aims to build on this previous research by investigating the 
efficacy of an adapted version of Mathews and Mackintosh’s (2000) CBM-I paradigm for 
individuals who are experiencing clinical levels of generalised anxiety.  
The study will utilise a single-case research design and employ a methodology 
similar to Blackwell and Holmes (2010). Given the paucity of research that has been 
carried out on CBM-I and GAD this paradigm can probably be considered as in the early 
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stages of investigation. According to Salkovskis (1995), single-case designs are vital in the 
early stages of new psychological treatments. Similarly, Kazdin (2011) asserts that single-
case designs are especially suitable during preliminary development and are a natural 
precursor to larger trials. Adopting a single-case design will permit greater depth of 
examination and reveal more about the dynamic effects of the CBM-I program on the 
participants than would be obtained using a traditional group design (Dallery, Cassidy, & 
Raiff, 2013).  
The current study will seek to address some of the limitations of the previous GAD 
focused CBM-I studies (Brosan et al., 2011; Hayes et al., 2010) in a bid to advance our 
understanding of the clinical potential of CBM-I. By virtue of the single-case design it will 
contain an inbuilt control aspect, something which is missing from Brosan et al. (2011)’s 
pre/post study design. Whereas Brosan et al. (2011) and Hayes et al. (2010) delivered bias 
modification procedures to their participants across four sessions and a single session 
respectively, this study will test a more intensive, multi-session CBM-I program consisting 
of seven, consecutive daily sessions. In addition the CBM-I program will be pure in so 
much as it will not be combined with CBM-A, as was the case with Brosan et al. (2011). In 
Hayes et al. (2010) the effect of CBM-I on worry, as measured using a breathing focus 
task, was assessed. In the current study, the primary outcome will be pathological worry; 
the defining GAD symptom and this will be assessed using a standardised measure. Unlike 
Brosan et al. (2011) and Hayes et al. (2010), a follow-up will be included to see if gains 
last beyond simply the moments immediately following training.  
The CBM-I will not be delivered in some form of test centre as is common with 
CBM-I research (Beard, 2011). Instead it will be accessed online, from patients’ homes, in 
keeping with Beard (2011)’s predicted application of this potential treatment. In line with a 
relatively new avenue of research that has found imagery processing of training materials 
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to enhance CBM-I outcomes (predominately using depressed samples) (e.g., Holmes et al., 
2009), the CBM-I protocol in the current study will contain an imagery component and 
will extend findings in an anxious sample experiencing clinical levels of generalised 
anxiety. 
  1.9 Research Hypotheses 
 Primary hypothesis: An online multi-session CBM-I package will reduce levels 
of worry in individuals presenting with clinical levels of generalised anxiety 
and this will be maintained at one week follow-up. 
 Secondary hypothesis: Individuals presenting with clinical levels of generalised 
anxiety receiving an online multi-session CBM-I package will demonstrate a 
reduction in level of negative interpretation bias and this will be maintained at 
one week follow-up. 
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Methodology  
2.1 Overview 
 This chapter details the methodology employed in the study. Information is 
provided on the design, participants, outcome measures, CBM-I task, ethical 
considerations and full procedure used to carry out the research.  
2.2 Design  
The study adopted a single-case series using a non-concurrent multiple-baseline 
across participants design with follow-up. In multiple-baseline designs, the effect of the 
intervention is evaluated by way of introducing it to different baselines at different points 
in time. If each baseline changes when the intervention is introduced, then such change can 
be more confidently attributed to the intervention rather than extraneous variables (Kazdin, 
1982).  
In the present study, the participants were each allocated to a baseline phase of 7, 9 
or 11 days (see figure 1).  Because of the small targeted sample size, block randomisation 
was used to ensure equal numbers in each baseline. This was achieved using a 
predetermined algorithm generated by the free online random number generator, 
RANDOM.ORG. During the baseline phase, participants completed the daily measures of 
worry, anxiety and an anxiety related bias (anxiety-bias). The intervention phase involved 
the daily completion of the CBM-I training task in addition to the daily measures, for seven 
days. Finally there was the follow-up phase where participants completed the daily 
measures for one more week.  
In addition to daily measures, a measure of interpretation bias and other anxiety 
measures were completed at pre-baseline, pre-CBM-I, post CBM-I and follow-up.  
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3 x 
participants 
 
Pre 
baseline 
 
Daily 
measures 
(7 days) 
  Pre-CBM-I 
Daily 
measures 
(7 days) 
Post CBM-I 
Daily 
measures 
(7 days) 
Follow 
up 
2 x 
participants 
 
Pre 
baseline 
 
Daily 
measures 
(9 days) 
 Pre-CBM-I 
Daily 
measures 
(7 days) 
Post CBM-I 
Daily 
measures 
(7 days) 
Follow 
up 
2 x 
participants 
 
Pre 
baseline 
 
Daily 
measures 
(11 days) 
Pre-CBM-I 
Daily 
measures 
(7 days) 
Post CBM-I 
Daily 
measures 
(7 days) 
Follow 
up 
 
Figure 1. Multiple-baseline design. 
 
 
The multiple-baseline across participants design is a common research strategy for 
assessing clinical interventions in applied settings and has been found to uphold critical 
empirical validity criteria in a variety of research contexts (Kazdin, 1992). The staggered 
delivery of the intervention across differing baseline phase lengths helps to eliminate 
alternative explanations of outcome change and enhances external validity by way of the 
multiple inter-participant replications (Morgan & Morgan, 2009). Furthermore it acts as a 
control against maturation and test-retest sensitivity (Harvey, May, & Kennedy, 2004). 
The non-concurrent feature meant that participants initiated the baseline and CBM-
I phases at different times to one another. This method has been proposed as an effective 
strategy in settings where more rigorous designs are not feasible (Harvey et al., 2004). 
Given that CBM-I is an innovative approach that is relatively untested in GAD populations 
(Beard, 2011), the adopted design offers a feasible, suitable framework with the resources 
available to the present study.  
2.3 Participants  
 All participants were patients referred to Wellbeing Services within Norfolk and 
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Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust (NSFT) seeking help for anxiety.  
 2.3.1 Sample size.  
 A total of seven participants completed the present study (see table 2). Such a 
sample size is considered to be appropriate for single-case research (Kazdin, 2011) and is 
similar to other single-case studies investigating CBM-I (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; 
Clarke, 2012; Turner et al., 2011). Recruitment was impacted by challenging times across 
recruitment sites in which potential referrers spoke of having to deal with increased 
stressors such as service flux and job insecurity. Consequently their capacity to hold in 
mind the present study and refer patients was diminished (see appendix A for recruitment 
activity log). 
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Table 2 
Demographic Data and Screening Measure Scores of All Participants who Completed the 
Study 
 Participant 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    Age 26 38 68 45 64 33 22 
    Gender Female Female Male Female Female Female Male 
    Ethnicity 
White 
British 
White 
British 
White 
British 
White 
British 
White 
British 
White 
British 
White 
British 
    Baseline length  
    (days) 
11 9 7 7 9 7 11 
    PHQ-9 17 14 13 10 4 16 12 
    GAD-Q-IV 11.67 9.67 10.16 11.5 10.58 11 9.91 
    BSI- GSI 2.87 1.19 1.34 2.6 0.81 1.34 1.28 
    BSI- PST 46 35 30 40 22 36 34 
    BSI-PSDI 3.3 1.8 2.37 3.45 1.95 1.97 1.56 
    BSI- Somatization 2.43 0.71 0.71 3 0 1.23 1 
    BSI- Obsessive  3.17 2.33 1.33 3.83 0.83 3 2 
    Compulsive        
    BSI- Interpersonal- 4 1.75 1 4 2 1.25 2.25 
    Sensitivity        
    BSI-Depression 2.83 0.67 2.33 0.83 0.33 1.5 1.83 
        
    BSI- Anxiety 3 1.33 0.5 3.33 2.5 1.83 1.83 
        
    BSI-Hostility 3 0.8 1.4 2.4 0.2 1.2 1.8 
        
    BSI- Phobic-  3.6 2 0.2 2 0 0.6 0.8 
    Anxiety        
    BSI- Paranoid-  2.2 0.6 0.2 3.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 
    Ideation        
    BSI- Psychoticism 1.6 0.2 0.8 1.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Note. PHQ-9 = The Patient Health Questionnaire (Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001); 
GAD-Q-IV = The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (Newman et al., 2002); 
BSI = The Brief Symptom Questionnaire (Derogatis, 1975); GSI = Global Severity Index; 
PST = Positive Symptom Total; PSDI = Positive Symptom Distress Index. 
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2.3.2 Inclusion criteria. 
The inclusion criteria were as follows: 
1. All participants were required to be at least 18 years old as the present study is 
specifically interested in the efficacy of CBM-I for adults.  
2. All participants were required to obtain a score of 5.7 or greater on the Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002) to increase the 
likelihood that they meet clinical criteria for GAD.  
3. All participants were required to have a working home computer with access to the 
internet and basic computer skills. This was necessary so that they could access and 
navigate the CBM-I task.  
4. All participants had to be proficient in reading and spoken English so that they 
could complete the self-report measures and understand the CBM-I training 
material. 
 2.3.3 Exclusion criteria. 
 The exclusion criteria were as follows (see figure 2 for a participant flow chart):  
1. A score of 20 or higher on the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke, 
Spitzer, & Williams, 2001) indicating severe depression would have excluded 
participants. The rational was that severe low mood may significantly impact 
engagement with the CBM-I task and possibly affect biases associated with anxiety 
in a way that may not be detected by the present study. Furthermore depression is 
associated with different information processing biases (e.g., Rude, Wenzlaff, 
Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002) that require different training materials (e.g., 
Blackwell & Holmes, 2010). 
2. A known psychotic illness, brain injury, learning disability or alcohol problem 
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would exclude participants on the grounds that their response to the CBM-I would 
be more difficult to anticipate and therefore presented greater risk. 
3. Engaging in psychotherapy at any stage of the study would have resulted in 
exclusion as this could potentially confound the findings.  
 
Figure 2. Participant flow chart. 
Referred                
(n = 17) 
Screened             
(n = 11) 
           Declined                    
(n = 6) 
Enrolled               
(n = 11) 
           Excluded                       
(n = 0) 
Completed             
(n = 8) 
                     Withdrew              
(n = 3) 
 Two participants withdrew during the 
baseline phase for reasons unknown  
 
   One participant withdrew during the 
baseline phase because they received 
an offer of counselling that was likely 
to start before their completion of the 
study and also because they had 
technical issues with their home 
computer   
Data omitted  
(n = 1) 
 One participant was omitted from the 
analyses for not having completed two 
consecutive days of the CBM-I task.      
Final total             
(n = 7) 
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 2.3.4 Individual participants. 
 The following summaries for each participant include the reasons for their referral 
to the Wellbeing Service, whether they have received any previous psychological help, and 
the nature of their anxiety. 
 2.3.4.1 Participant one. 
 Participant one was a 26 year old female referred to the Wellbeing Service due to 
an increase in anxiety triggered by health related complaints from her children. She 
reported to have struggled with anxiety since she was sexually assaulted at the age of 14 
years and that she has had three different courses of counselling over the past 10 years. She 
described her most frequent topics of worry as her family, financial, work, and the future 
generally.  
 2.3.4.2 Participant two. 
 Participant two was a 38 year old female referred to the Wellbeing Service due to 
an increase in anxiety triggered by a combination of work and family related stressors 
occurring in a short space of time. She reported her anxiety to be lifelong and that she has 
never received any psychotherapy. She described her most frequent topics of worry as her 
family, work and domestic responsibilities.  
 2.3.4.3 Participant three. 
 Participant three was a 68 year old male referred to the Wellbeing Service due to an 
increase in anxiety and depression symptoms in response to difficulties adjusting with 
retirement. He reported to have struggled with anxiety all his life, that he worries about 
everything and that he has never received any psychotherapy.  
 2.3.4.4 Participant four. 
 Participant four was a 45 year old female referred to the Wellbeing Service in 
response to repeated visits to her General Practitioner (GP) complaining of worsening 
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anxiety and medically unexplained symptoms. She reported that her anxiety was triggered 
3 years ago due to work related stress and that since then she has received a few 
counselling sessions for anxiety and depression and completed a stress control workshop. 
She described her biggest worries as crowds and of being attacked by a stranger.  
 2.3.4.5 Participant five. 
 Participant five was a 64 year old female who self referred to the Wellbeing Service 
after accompanying her husband to a stress control workshop for support and deciding that 
she would like to manage her own anxiety better. She reported to have struggled with 
anxiety since she was a child and that she received some form of counselling about 10 
years ago for depression. She described worrying most about her family, driving, death and 
other people’s perceptions of her.  
 2.3.4.6 Participant six. 
 Participant six was a 33 year old female referred to the Wellbeing Service due to 
anxiety, panic and exhaustion. She reported longstanding anxiety but that since 2008 it had 
become increasingly unmanageable due to the death of her father, her own chronic pain 
resulting in her having to give up her career, and her mother’s deteriorating health. She 
reported having previously received grief counselling as well as psychology input at a pain 
clinic. She described her biggest worries as her mother’s health, her future job prospects 
and how others perceive her.  
 2.3.4.7 Participant seven. 
 Participant seven was a 22 year old male who had been referred to the Wellbeing 
Service prompted by his father learning of the existence of GAD and persuading him that 
he might have it. He reported to have always worried but that it had got worse since 
starting university a couple of years ago. Since then he has received some low intensity 
CBT-based treatment with a Primary Wellbeing Practitioner. He reported to worry most 
  
47 
 
about his family, his girlfriend and university.  
2.4 Measures 
 This subsection is divided into three parts: i) the screening measures; ii) the 
primary outcome measure; and iii) the secondary outcome measures. To view all 
uncopyrighted measures please refer to the Appendices. 
 2.4.1 The screening measures. 
2.4.1.1 Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke et al., 2001).  
This brief questionnaire was used to screen out participants with severe levels of 
depression (see appendix B). It consists of nine questions that match the criteria in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-fourth edition (DSM-IV) for a 
major depressive episode.  
For the purposes of the present study, the PHQ-9 was used as a depression severity 
measure. Total scores range from 0 to 27 and scores for each question range from ‘0’ (not 
at all) to ‘3’ (nearly every day). A total score of 1-4 represents minimal depression; 5-9, 
mild depression; 10-14, moderate depression; 15-19, moderately severe depression; and 
20-27, severe depression.    
 The PHQ-9 is routinely used in primary care including the Wellbeing Services that 
the present study recruited from and typically takes two-three minutes to complete. It was 
therefore a suitable depression measure to use.  
The authors of the PHQ-9 report various psychometric findings (Kroenke et al., 
2001). Internal reliability was found to be excellent when it was completed by 6,000 
patients in multiple primary care and obstetrics-gynaecology clinics, demonstrating 
Cronbach α of 0.89 and 0.86 respectively. At the severe level threshold, the specificity of 
the PHQ-9 for diagnosing major depression was 95% with a likelihood ratio of 13.6. It was 
also found to have good construct validity with severe levels associated with worst 
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functioning on all six domains of the Study Short Form General Health Survey (SF-20; 
Stewart, Hays, & Ware, 1988). Cameron, Crawford, Lawton, and Reid (2008) also 
validated the PHQ-9 using primary care patients and found this measure to demonstrate 
discriminant validity when compared to an established anxiety measure, internal 
consistency (e.g., a Cronbach α of 0.89) and robustness of factor structure.    
 2.4.1.2 Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis, 1975).  
 This 53-item questionnaire assesses the psychological symptom status of patients. 
In the present study it was used to gain an overall clinical picture of the participant’s 
presentation. The BSI consists of nine dimensions relating to general symptoms of mental 
health, namely somatization, obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, 
anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation and psychotism. The questionnaire 
typically takes approximately ten minutes to complete. All items are ranked on a 5-point 
rating scale of ‘0’ (not at all) to ‘5’ (extremely) to reflect perceived distress during the past 
seven days. Of primary interest to the researcher were items relating to psychotism to 
check whether further assessment was required to ensure that participants were not floridly 
psychotic, and therefore ineligible.  
 Derogatis and Melisaratos (1983) reported good internal consistency reliability for 
the nine dimensions of the BSI with Cronbach α ranging from 0.71 to 0.85. The BSI 
manual (Derogatis, 1993) sites factor analyses results confirming the a-priori construction 
of the different dimensions and correlations with the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised 
(SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1977) ranging between 0.92 and 0.99.  
 2.4.1.3 Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 
2002).  
 This self-report diagnostic measure of GAD is closely based on criteria for GAD 
set out in the DSM-IV (see appendix C). It is described by Newman et al. (2002) as an 
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effective way to screen for the presence or absence of diagnosable GAD and so this was its 
primary purpose in the present study. It is a much more convenient and quicker method of 
screening for GAD compared to structured diagnostic interviews and typically takes 
approximately five minutes to complete. The GAD-Q-IV has been used as a screening tool 
for GAD in other CBM-I studies (Hayes et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2009). In the current 
study it will also be used as an outcome measure to assess severity of generalised anxiety.  
 The GAD-Q-IV consists of nine questions that include: five yes/no checklists 
assessing the occurrence of worry, a DSM-IV symptom check list, a listing of the most 
frequent topics of worry and two 8-point Likert scales ranging from ‘0’ (none) to ‘8’ (very 
severely) assessing distress and interference of worry and physical symptoms. The authors 
recommend a weighted scoring system that provides an overall index of the severity of 
GAD.  
 The maximum score is 13 however the authors reported that a score cut-off of 5.7 
yields the optimal balance between sensitivity (83%) and specificity (89%). The authors 
also noted this cut-off to have generated a false positive rate of 11% and a false negative 
rate of 17% with the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; 
Brown, Di Nardo, & Barlow, 1994); that is, it incorrectly classified 11% of cases as having 
GAD and incorrectly classified 17% of cases as not having GAD.  
 Newman et al. (2002) found that in a sample of undergraduate students, the    
GAD-Q-IV successfully discriminated individuals diagnosed with GAD using either the 
ADIS-IV or the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV, Lifetime Version 
(ADIS-IV-L; Di Nardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994) from individuals diagnosed with panic 
disorder and social phobia - common co-morbid diagnoses of GAD. Newman and 
colleagues also found the GAD-Q-IV to have good convergent and discriminant validity 
compared to a battery of other anxiety-related measures. When test-retest reliability was 
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examined using the 5.7 cut-off score, a Kappa agreement between Time 1 and Time 2 of 
0.64 was generated. In addition, the authors performed a logistic regression which showed 
that the GAD-Q-IV score at time 2 was reliably predicted by time 1 score                    
(X
2
(1, N = 148) = 42.1, p < .001).  
 In another study where the ADIS-IV-L and the GAD-Q-IV were administered 
using a cut-off score of 5.7 (Luterek, Turk, Heimberg, Fresco, & Mennin, 2002), the  
GAD-Q-IV correctly classified 50 of 53 non-anxious community participants as not having 
GAD (96.2% specificity) and all of the 31 participants with GAD as having GAD (100% 
specificity).   
 Newman et al. (2002) also compared their study’s undergraduate sample to a 
community sample of individuals with GAD and found that they did not differ on the 
PSWQ and the STAI suggesting that these results are generalisable to community samples. 
 Beyond these studies, relatively little psychometric data is available on the      
GAD-Q-IV although it has been tested favorably in some research using older adult 
samples (Diefenbach, Tolin, Meunier, & Gilliam, 2009; Staples & Mohlman, 2012; Webb 
et al., 2008). Also some confusion remains over the optimal cut-off to use and optimal 
scoring system (Rodebaugh, Holaway, & Heimberg, 2008).  
 Because of these considerations and in the absence of a rigorous diagnostic 
assessment in the present study, caution was exercised when describing the diagnostic 
status of eligible participants who met Newman and colleagues’ advised cut-off of 5.7. 
Participants in the current study are viewed as experiencing clinical levels of generalised 
anxiety, rather than as having diagnosed GAD.  
 2.4.2 The primary outcome measure. 
 2.4.2.1 The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990).  
 The PSWQ is the most popular measure of pathological worry in clinical 
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populations (Fresco, Mennin, Heimberg, & Turk, 2003) and is widely considered as the 
best assessor of symptom change in GAD (e.g., Fisher, 2006; Gould et al., 2004). This 
questionnaire typically takes approximately five minutes to complete. In the present study 
it was used to monitor, daily, the participant’s level of worry.  
 The PSWQ is a 16-item inventory consisting of statements designed to capture the 
generality, excessiveness and uncontrollability of pathological worry (Fresco et al., 2003). 
It has a 5-point answer scale ranging from ‘1’ (not at all typical of me) to ‘5’ (very typical 
of me) with a total score ranging from 16 to 80 (see appendix D).  
 The PSWQ has been found to have good internal consistency in GAD patients: 
Brown, Antony, and Barlow (1992) reported a Cronbach α of 0.86 in their GAD patient 
group, as does Dear et al. (2011). The PSWQ has also been shown to discriminate patients 
with GAD from community controls and patients with other anxiety disorders (Brown et 
al., 1992) and been found to be sensitive to the detection of GAD (Fresco et al., 2003). 
Furthermore the PSWQ is positively correlated with other self-report measures of worry 
(e.g., Beck, Stanley, & Zebb, 1995) and has demonstrated good test-retest reliability (e.g., 
Meyer et al., 1990) and responsiveness to change, with large effect sizes at post treatment 
(Cohen’s d = 0.71) and at follow-up (Cohen’s d = 1.48) (Dear et al., 2011). 
 2.4.3 The secondary outcome measures. 
2.4.3.1 Anxiety Visual Analogue Scales (VAS).  
Based on Blackwell and Holmes (2010), two VAS were designed: one measures 
subjective anxiety by asking the participant to rate the statement ‘How anxious have you 
felt over the past 24 hours?’ and the other measures a typical anxiety bias pertaining to 
catastrophisation with the statement ‘when I imagine outcomes for events, I expect the 
worst’ (see appendix E). The VAS are quick and easy to complete, take less than one 
minute to complete, and are ideal for monitoring daily change. The scales were 10cm long 
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anchored with ‘0’ (not at all) at one end and ‘100’ (extremely) at the opposite end. 
 2.4.3.2 The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Assessment (GAD-7; Spitzer, Kroenke, 
Williams, & Lowe, 2006). 
 The GAD-7 is both a brief screening tool for GAD and a general measure for 
anxiety that is routinely used in primary care services (see appendix F). The questionnaire 
typically takes 2-3 minutes to complete. In the present study it was used to assess any 
changes in the participant’s level of general anxiety.  
 The measure consists of seven statements that pertain to anxiety symptoms. The 
participant must rate how often he/she has been bothered by each of them for the past two 
weeks. Scores for each question range from ‘0’ (not at all) to ‘3’ (nearly every day). Total 
scores range from 0 to 27 with the following severity ranges: minimal, 0-4; mild, 5-9, 
moderate, 10-14, and severe, 15-21.  
 Although there is relatively limited data available on its psychometric properties, 
the GAD-7 has been found to have impressive internal consistency (Cronbach α of 0.89 - 
0.92) (Lowe et al., 2008; Spitzer et al., 2006), good test-retest reliability (intraclass 
correlation = 0.83) and a cut-off point of 10 or greater yields sensitivity and specificity 
exceeding 0.80 (Spitzer et al., 2006). The study by Dear et al. (2011) found the GAD-7 to 
have good internal consistency (Cronbach α of 0.79) and responsiveness to change with 
large effect sizes between pre-treatment and post treatment (Cohen’s d = 1.10) and pre-
treatment and follow-up (Cohen’s d = 1.85). 
2.4.3.3 The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 
1983).  
The STAI is a self-report measure of the severity of current symptoms of anxiety 
and a generalised propensity to be anxious. It contains two subscales: the state anxiety 
scale which evaluates current anxiety and the trait anxiety scale which evaluates relatively 
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stable aspects of ‘anxiety proneness’ (Julian, 2011).  
Many other CBM studies using clinically anxious populations have used at least 
one of the STAI subscales to measure anxiety (e.g., Amir et al., 2010; Brosan et al., 2011). 
The STAI has 40 items in total, 20 within each the two subscales. It typically takes 
around ten minutes to complete. Responses for the state anxiety subscale assess the 
intensity of current feelings and there are four options ranging from ‘1’ (not at all) to ‘4’ 
(very much so). Responses for the trait anxiety scale assess frequency of feelings 
generally, with options ranging from ‘1’ (almost never) to ‘4’ (almost always). Scores 
range from 20 to 80 on each subscale with higher scores indicating greater anxiety. A    
cut-off point of 39-40 has been suggested by the authors to detect clinically significant 
symptoms for the state subscale.  
The trait scale has been widely used in treatment studies of GAD and has been 
related to change following interventions (Fisher & Durham, 1999). Spielberger et al. 
(1983) report excellent internal consistency coefficients ranging from 0.86 to 0.95 and 
good test-retest reliability (e.g., median test-retest correlations of 0.77 for college students 
and 0.70 for high school students). Because the state subscale is designed to detect 
transitory states, test- retest coefficients are lower for this subscale compared to the trait 
subscale. With regard content validity, the STAI has been found to have strong correlations 
with other anxiety measures (0.73 & 0.85) (Spielberger et al., 1983) although its construct 
and discriminant validity appear to be less robust (Julian, 2011).The STAI’s ability to 
detect change is stronger for the state subscale however the mediation analysis conducted 
by Salemink et al. (2010) suggests that changes on the trait subscale are more reflective of 
changes in interpretive bias.   
2.4.3.4 The Scrambled Sentences Test (SST; Wenzlaff, 1993). 
The SST was used to measure level of negative interpretation bias (an example SST 
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can be viewed in appendix G). 
There were a total of 80 scrambled sentences, each comprising six words with two 
possible coherent resolutions made up of five words (see appendix H). One combination 
would form a positive resolution and another combination would form a negative 
resolution. The participant was required to place numbers above each word indicating the 
intended order. For example: 
The participant was presented with the following scrambled sentence: 
will me most help hurt people 
There are two possible resolutions: 
a) most people will hurt me  (negative resolution)  
which they would number as : 
3 5 1  4 2 
will me most help hurt people 
b) most people will help me  (positive resolution) 
which they would number as: 
3 5 1 4  2 
will me most help hurt people 
Prior to completing the sentences, participants were presented with the same 
instructional set as that used by Standage, Ashwin, and Fox (2010). This explained the 
format of the task and included a completed, unscrambled sentence as an example.   
They were then presented with a six digit number for ten seconds and asked to 
remember it. This acted as a cognitive load so as to reduce the influence of effortful 
processing that can lead to a positive response bias (Bowler et al., 2012).  
They were then required to unscramble as many sentences to ‘form the first 
statement that comes to mind’ as quickly as possible. The time limit was four minutes, 
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after which they were required to write down the six digit number.  
Interpretation bias scores are obtained by calculating the proportion of negative 
resolutions generated. 
The 80 scrambled sentences were ‘scrambled’ using RANDOM.ORG and their 
order was block randomised for each participant with 20 sentences presented at pre-
baseline, 20 sentences at pre-CBM-I, 20 at post CBM-I and 20 at follow-up. The six digit 
number, instructions and scrambled sentences were all contained on three A4 sheets. 
All of the sentences are based on the main worry themes identified in the Worry 
Domains Questionnaire (WDQ: Tallis, Davey, & Bond, 1994) and some are replications of 
those used by Standage et al. (2010). The sentences were checked for content and 
relevance to GAD by two independent Clinical Psychologists and a Trainee Clinical 
Psychologist.  
The SST is a suitable measure for the purposes of the current study because it has 
been successfully used to detect interpretation bias change in other CBM-I studies (e.g., 
Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Bowler et al., 2012; Standage et al., 2010) and is easily 
tailored to general worry related biases.  
2.5 Training Materials 
 2.5.1 Text-based ambiguous scenarios task. 
 The text-based ambiguous scenarios paradigm developed by Mathews and 
Mackintosh (2000) was used as the CBM-I task to modify interpretation bias. This is the 
most commonly used CBM-I task within CBM-I studies (Beard, 2011).  
In accordance with other studies testing CBM-I in GAD populations (Hayes et al., 
2010; Hirsch et al., 2009), scenarios covering common worry topics identified in the WDQ 
were used including relationships, lack of confidence, aimless future, work incompetence, 
financial and physical threat. Some scenarios were replications or adaptations of those used 
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by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) and Clarke (2012); the rest were created for the 
current study.  
Scenarios were checked for content and relevance to GAD by two independent 
Clinical Psychologists and a Trainee Clinical Psychologist. The aim was to try to ensure 
that the scenarios and word fragments would make sense and be applicable to as many 
ability levels and life experiences of participants as possible.  
The format of the CBM-I task is that participants are presented with scenarios (four 
lines in length) that remain ambiguous until the final word which is presented as a word 
fragment. The final word always resolves the scenario in either a benign or positive 
manner. Participants are required to solve the word fragment by entering the first letter that 
is missing. At the conclusion of each completed scenario participants are presented with a 
comprehension question, consistent with the scenario, to ensure that they have understood 
the disambiguated scenario and, importantly, its benign/positive conclusion. Participants 
must answer either yes or no to this question and are then presented with immediate 
feedback as to whether or not their answer is correct or incorrect. Correct answers always 
resolve the scenario in a benign/positive manner and incorrect answers always provide a 
negative resolution.   
In total there are 350 scenarios which are split into seven daily blocks of 50 trials. 
Within each daily block the scenarios are further divided into blocks of 10, between which 
participants can take a rest break if they desire. Each daily session takes approximately 30-
45 minutes to complete depending on rest breaks and task speed. 
To ensure an equal spread of the scenarios by worry topic across the sessions, 
scenarios were block randomised (using RANDOM.ORG) to each block of 10, within each 
day, according to their associated worry topic.  
The following is an example of a training scenario with a comprehension question: 
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‘You see a job vacancy advertised in your local paper. 
You are interested in what would be involved and ask for details.  
On hearing the details,  
you think that you would be’ 
i d _ _ l (ideal) 
‘Do you think the chances of you getting the job are poor?’ (No) 
Instructions are presented at the beginning of each daily session to remind 
participants of the structure of training and to emphasise the importance of visual imagery 
(see appendix I).  
2.5.1.1 Imagery instructions. 
The following was included in the instructions and pertains to imagery: ‘In order 
for you to get the most out of completing the sessions, it is really important that you create 
an image in your head of each situation as if you are the main person in it and it is actually 
happening. The more vividly you can imagine that you are in the situations, the more you 
will get out of the sessions. Also, when imagining that you are in the situations, try to 
imagine that you are looking out through your own eyes rather than looking at yourself in 
the situation’.  
This is followed by an actual imagery exercise, which requires the participant to 
imagine a scene and then rate how vividly they can imagine it.     
 Based on Blackwell and Holmes (2010), as a further reminder for participants to 
actively imagine themselves when completing the training materials, at a random point 
within each block of 10 scenarios, the following question appears: ‘how vividly were you 
able to imagine yourself in the previous situation?’ Immediately below the question is a 
horizontal scale with ‘0’ (I could not imagine it at all) at one end and ‘10’ (I could see it 
perfectly, as if I were there) at the other end. Participants are required to enter a number 
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between 1 and 10.  
The final exercise participants complete before starting each daily CBM-I session is 
a practice scenario which, like the imagery exercise, is different each day.   
The CBM-I task was programmed and accessed via a web-based platform called 
‘CBS Trials’ provided by Cambridge Brain Sciences Incorporate.  
2.6 Ethical Considerations 
Prior to commencing recruitment, the study was reviewed by the Proportionate 
Review Sub-Committee of the North West Greater Manchester South National Research 
Ethics Service (NRES) on the 22.05.2013 and also by the Norfolk and Suffolk National 
Health Service Foundation Trust (NSFT) Local Research Governance Committee on the 
30.05.2013.  
 Following some minor amendments the study was given a favourable opinion from 
each committee and a copy of the relevant paperwork can be found in appendixes J and K. 
Sponsorship and indemnity insurance was provided by the Research Enterprise and 
Engagement department of the University of East Anglia (UEA) (see appendix L). 
All participants were first approached by clinicians who provided them with a brief 
description of the study. They were then asked if they were potentially interested in 
participating in the study and if the researcher was allowed to contact them. Only those that 
said they were interested and who gave permission to be contacted by the researcher, were 
contacted. Prior to completing the consent form (see appendix M), all participants were 
given a detailed verbal explanation by the researcher of what the study involved, had the 
consent form fully explained to them, had the opportunity to ask any questions and were 
provided with a participant information sheet (see appendix N) which included the 
researcher’s contact details. All participants were provided with at least 72 hours to read 
over the patient information sheet before being invited to make a decision of whether they 
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wished to participate or not. No screening measures were administered until full consent 
had been obtained.  
Confidentiality was upheld in accordance with the criteria set out in the Data 
Protection Act (1998). All participants were initially identified by clinicians and were only 
contacted by the researcher after providing verbal consent. The researcher did not have 
access to client records at any stage. All data containing personally identifiable information 
was stored securely in a locked cabinet or digitally on password protected files. All data 
was coded anonymously using participant numbers and was stored separately from any 
identifying information such as participant name or contact telephone numbers. Access to 
the material was restricted to the researcher and research supervisors working at UEA. All 
data are anonymised and will remain stored in secure university premises before eventually 
being destroyed after approximately ten years. 
The study was not anticipated to have any harmful effects as none have been 
reported in other CBM studies to the best of the researcher’s knowledge. Participants were 
fully informed of their right to withdraw at any stage of the study, without having to 
provide a reason and they were advised that this would have no impact on their clinical 
care.  
Due to the nature of the study design, participants were required to complete 
multiple daily measures during the baseline phase (up to 11 days), during the seven day 
CBM-I phase and the seven day follow-up phase. In addition to this, the CBM-I phase 
required them to set aside an hour every day in order to complete the training task.  
It was made clear to participants from the start that completing the research would 
require them to delay any psychological treatment that became available to them during 
their participation and that should they wish not to delay it then they would have to 
withdraw.  
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 Participants were advised to take a break or to stop the task in the event that they 
became distressed during a session of CBM-I. If their distress were to persist they were 
advised that they could contact their GP.  
In terms of managing risks to the researcher, risk protocols were agreed with the 
primary supervisor regarding home visits and a buddy system was implemented in 
accordance with NSFT lone worker policies.  
The financial burden of participating was low as all that was required was a 
computer with access to the internet. Each participant was provided with up to £5.00 travel 
expenses if they chose to meet the researcher on NHS premises for the initial contact 
session rather than their home.  
All participants were fully debriefed following the study’s completion and 
encouraged to ask any questions they had. They also indicated whether they wished to 
receive a simple results summary.  
2.7 Procedure 
 After ethical approval was obtained, Wellbeing Services across Norfolk and 
Suffolk were contacted and provided with a short presentation followed by a question and 
answer session. This took place at monthly business meetings and clinician supervision 
sessions. Within these meetings a plan was collaboratively developed with the clinical 
team for how best to identify potentially suitable participants and to manage their 
participation at each recruitment site. 
 A flow chart detailing the study procedure is presented in figure 3. Once clinical 
teams had expressed an interest in the study and a willingness to refer, a member of that 
team approached patients they felt might be eligible to participate and provided them with 
a brief, simple description of the study and what participating involved. If the patient was 
interested in learning more they were asked if they would provide verbal consent for the 
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researcher to contact them and this was evidenced in the patient's clinical notes (e.g., 
‘verbal consent for researcher to contact granted by patient’).  
 The researcher, upon being notified by the referring clinician, then contacted the 
patient by telephone. The patient was provided with a full explanation of the study and an 
opportunity to ask questions. The patient was then asked if they were potentially interested 
in participating. If the patient was interested, the participant details sheet (see appendix O) 
was completed, an initial appointment was arranged, and the participant information sheet 
and consent form were sent out to them.  
 After consent was obtained, the patient and researcher met face to face and the 
patient completed the screening measures (GAD-Q-IV, PHQ-9 & BSI). If the patient's 
scores were not suitable on these measures they would have been told that they were not 
eligible, thanked for their time and their clinical team would have been notified. As it was, 
all patients that were screened had suitable scores. Consequently they were invited to 
participate and asked if they wished their GP to be sent a letter notifying them of their 
participation (see appendix P).  
 The participant was then block randomised to one of the three baseline lengths (7, 9 
or 11 days) and completed all outcome measures (GAD-7, GAD-Q-IV, STAI, SST, PSWQ 
& VAS).  
 For the duration of their baseline phase, the participant was asked to complete the 
daily VAS and PSWQ at approximately the same time each day. They were offered daily 
reminders to assist them with this however they all declined.  
 At the end of the baseline phase, the researcher met up again with the participant 
and non-daily outcome measures were completed for a second time. Following this the 
participant accessed the CBM-I program on their personal computer and completed their 
first session with the researcher present for instructional guidance. Similar to Blackwell 
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and Holmes (2010), the participant was asked to take a ‘field perspective’ when 
completing the training scenarios (i.e., to imagine that they are in the scenarios looking 
through their own eyes as opposed to looking at themselves from an ‘observer 
perspective’) (see Holmes, Coughtrey, & Connor, 2008).  
  For the remaining six sessions of the CBM-I phase, the participant was asked to 
continue completing daily sessions of the CBM-I task and to do so at approximately the 
same time every day in addition to the daily measures. Again, daily reminders were offered 
but all were declined.   
 After the CBM-I phase, the researcher met with the participant and outcome 
measures were completed for a third time. After this meeting, the participant continued to 
complete the daily measures for a further seven days during the follow-up phase. 
 At the one week follow-up, the researcher met with the participant and all outcome 
measures were completed for a final time. Finally the participant was fully debriefed, given 
the opportunity to ask any questions and reimbursed any accrued travel costs up to £5.00. 
Referring clinical teams were then notified of the participant’s study completion. 
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Figure 3. Flow chart of the study procedure. 
Clinician identifies a potentially suitable participant 
 Clinician contacts patient and briefly describes study.  
 If patient is interested in participating, they are asked to provide verbal consent for researcher 
to contact them. 
 Researcher contacts patient by telephone, explains the study, answers any questions the 
patient has, and asks if patient is potentially interested in participating.  
 If patient is interested, participant details sheet is completed. 
 The patient information sheet and consent form is sent to the patient.  
  
If patient satisfies eligibility criteria: 
 Participant block randomised to baseline condition. 
 Participant completes all outcome measures. 
 
Participant completes daily outcome measures for 7, 9 or 11 days duration depending on 
randomisation. 
 
Researcher meets with participant:  
 Researcher guides participant through first CBM-I session.  
 All outcome measures are completed.  
For 7 days (this includes first session with researcher present), participant completes: 
 Daily CBM-I session. 
 Daily measures.  
Researcher meets with participant:  
 All outcome measures are completed.  
For 7 days participant completes daily measures  
Researcher meets with participant:  
 All outcome measures are completed.  
 Debrief 
 
Recruitment 
Allocation 
Baseline 
CBM-I 
Follow-up 
 Researcher and patient meet up. 
 If consent is obtained, screening questionnaires are administered and eligibility 
criteria are checked. 
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Results  
3.1 Overview 
 This chapter presents the results of the present study. Data collected on the primary 
outcome measure, the PSWQ, as well as the VAS, are subjected to visual inspection to 
evaluate whether the CBM-I package produces a response. This is supplemented by the 
calculation of reliable change, clinically significant change and statistically significant 
change on outcomes at pre-assessment, pre-CBM-I, post CBM-I and one week follow-up. 
3.2 Visual Inspection of Data 
 To evaluate the impact of CBM-I training on worry (in accordance with the 
primary research hypothesis), anxiety and a typical anxiety bias (anxiety-bias), visual 
inspection is performed on graphic data using the criteria set out by Kazdin (2011).  
 The first category of criteria is magnitude of change which includes changes in 
mean across the three phases of baseline, CBM-I and follow-up, and changes in level. 
Changes in mean refers to whether mean scores of worry, anxiety and anxiety-bias change 
across the phases. Changes in level refers to whether there is a shift in score at the very 
beginning of the phase from the very end of the previous phase. 
 The second category of criteria is rate of change which includes changes in trend or 
slope, and latency of the change. Changes in the trend or slope refers to the trend line 
which characterises the data within each phase and whether it reflects a change from the 
trend line in the previous phase. Latency of change refers to the speed at which change 
occurs after the onset of the CBM-I phase.  
 The greater the change in both magnitude and rate between the baseline phase and 
the CBM-I phase on an outcome, the more confidently it can be ascribed that the CBM-I 
had an effect and that it was responsible for the change (Kazdin, 2011). In the current 
study, the CBM-I package is judged to have had an effect on an outcome for any one 
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participant if there appears to be change in the CBM-I phase and it is judged to be reliable 
in accordance with Kazdin’s (2011) criteria. Similar to the classification system used by 
Blackwell and Holmes (2010), if reliable change is judged to have occurred on the primary 
outcome, the PSWQ, then the participant is classed as a responder. Alternatively if it is 
judged that no reliable change has occurred for worry then the participant is classed as a 
non-responder.  
 To assess whether effects last beyond CBM-I training, Kazdin’s (2011) criteria is 
applied to the follow-up phase. If visual inspection reveals no reliable change between the 
follow-up phase and the CBM-I phase in the direction of deterioration, then it is judged 
that gains have maintained at follow-up and the participant is classed as a maintainer. 
Where gains are judged to have not maintained in the follow-up phase, the participant is 
classed as a non-maintainer.  
 To aid visual inspection, Kendall’s tau correlation is calculated for each outcome’s 
baseline phase (between scores & days) enabling a statistical assessment of baseline 
stability.   
 3.2.1 Participant one. 
 3.2.1.1 Worry.   
 Visual inspection of figure 4 and Kendall’s tau analysis reveals a stable baseline 
(tau = .41, p = .25). At the start of the CBI-I training, there is a small reduction in mean 
worry and no change in level of worry. However there is a delayed latency of improvement 
as there is a short downward slope of worry scores (indicating reduced worry) after the 
second day of the CBM-I phase which then stabilises. In the follow-up phase there is a 
small increase in mean worry, a small downward shift in level of worry at the start with 
worry scores reversing to an increasing trend (indicating increased worry) after a couple of 
days. 
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 Overall the reduced worry observed in the CBM-I phase is of a very small 
magnitude and it starts after a two day latency period in which worry scores remained 
totally unchanged from the baseline phase. Consequently the improvement is not 
considered sufficiently reliable and so this participant is classed as a non-responder and 
also therefore a non-maintainer.   
Figure 4. Participant one’s (non-responder/non-maintainer) daily and mean worry scores 
across all phases. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
 
 3.2.1.2 Anxiety and anxiety-bias.  
 Visual inspection of figure 5 reveals a baseline phase with high variability and 
increasing trends of anxiety and anxiety-bias scores (indicating deterioration), although not 
significantly so as indicated by Kendall’s tau analysis (for both: tau = .26, p = .3). In the 
CBM-I phase there is an equivalent reduction in mean anxiety and anxiety-bias, a large 
downward shift in level for both at the start (indicating an immediate drop in scores), and a 
decreasing trend of scores (indicating decreasing anxiety and anxiety-bias). In the    
follow-up phase there is a further reduction in mean anxiety (indicating improvement).  
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Worry 
Baseline CBM-I Follow-up 
Days 
P
S
W
Q
 s
co
re
 
Mean Worry 
  
67 
 
However there is an increase in mean anxiety-bias, and another downward shift in level of 
both at the start followed by a fluctuating, mostly increasing, trend (indicating 
deterioration). 
 Overall there appears to be an improvement in anxiety and anxiety-bias in the 
CBM-I and follow-up phases however this is accompanied by large variability making it 
difficult to interpret whether the CBM-I was responsible for such change. Consequently 
the CBM-I is judged as not having a reliable effect on anxiety and anxiety-bias for this 
participant.
 Figure 5. Participant one’s daily and mean anxiety and anxiety-bias scores across all 
phases. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. 
 
 3.2.2 Participant two. 
 3.2.2.1 Worry.  
 Visual inspection of figure 6 and Kendall’s tau analysis reveals a significant, 
increasing trend in the baseline phase (tau = .92, p = .001). In the CBM-I phase mean 
worry increases. At the start of this phase there is no change in level (indicating no 
immediate CBM-I effect) and this is followed initially by a decreasing worry trend which 
then reverts to an increasing trend (indicating worry increased again). In the follow-up 
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phase there is little change in mean or level of worry at the start, and scores stabilise.   
 Overall there appears to be a slowing in the rate of deterioration of worry in the  
CBM-I and follow-up phases, however it is minimal, and there is no improvement in 
worry. Therefore this participant is classed as a non-responder and also therefore a non-
maintainer.  
Figure 6. Participant two’s (non-responder/non-maintainer) daily and mean worry scores 
across all phases. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
 
 3.2.2.2 Anxiety and anxiety-bias. 
 Visual inspection of figure 7 and Kendall’s tau analysis reveals a non-significant 
decreasing trend of anxiety (tau = -.3, p = .3) and anxiety-bias scores (tau = -.52, p = .09) 
in the baseline phase with anxiety demonstrating a greater degree of fluctuation. In the 
CBM-I phase there is a clear reduction in mean anxiety and anxiety-bias with no shift in 
level for both at the start although there is a sharp drop in anxiety-bias scores (a dramatic 
improvement) after the third CBM-I session and therefore a delayed latency of change. 
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CBM-I phase. In the follow-up phase there is a further clear reduction in mean anxiety and 
anxiety-bias scores, a downward shift in level for both at the start (immediate 
improvement) and stabilisation of both.  
 Overall there appears to be an improvement in anxiety and anxiety-bias in the 
CBM-I and follow-up phases. However the magnitude of this change and rate of change 
are relatively pronounced for anxiety-bias, but not so for anxiety, mostly due to larger 
variability, making an interpretation more difficult. Consequently for this participant, the 
CBM-I is judged as having a reliable effect on anxiety-bias with gains maintaining at 
follow-up whereas for anxiety it is judged as not having a reliable effect.  
Figure 7. Participant two’s daily and mean anxiety and anxiety-bias scores across all 
phases. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. 
 
 3.2.3 Participant three. 
 3.2.3.1 Worry.  
 Visual inspection of figure 8 and Kendall’s tau analysis reveals a non-significant 
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there is little change in mean worry or level at the start, although the direction of trend 
reverses upwards (worry increased). In the follow-up phase there is a small change in mean 
worry and level of worry at the start which then stabilises. 
 Overall there appears to be little change to worry scores in the CBM-I and    
follow-up phases therefore this participant is classed as a non-responder and also therefore 
a non-maintainer. 
Figure 8. Participant three’s (non-responder/non-maintainer) daily and mean worry scores 
across all phases. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
 
 3.2.3.2 Anxiety and anxiety-bias. 
 Visual inspection of figure 9 reveals a decreasing trend of scores on both outcomes 
in the baseline phase, which is most pronounced for anxiety. Kendall’s tau analysis 
indicates that the trend is non-significant for anxiety-bias scores (tau = -.59, p = .09) 
whereas it is significant for anxiety scores (tau = -.78, p = .02). In the CBM-I phase there 
is no shift in level for each at the start however there is a reverse shift to an upward trend 
(deterioration) which is dramatic for anxiety scores. In terms of means, anxiety-bias 
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decreased whereas anxiety increased in the CBM-I phase. In the follow-up phase there is 
an increase in mean anxiety and anxiety-bias, an increase in level of anxiety and anxiety-
bias, and greater stabilisation.    
 Overall there appears to be little change in anxiety-bias scores in the CBM-I and 
follow-up phases whereas for anxiety scores there appears to be a notable change in rate 
and of magnitude in the direction of deterioration. However because anxiety scores 
significantly improved in the baseline phase (undermining their validity as a baseline) and 
because deterioration did not occur immediately after the introduction of CBM-I but rather 
after a two day delay, it is judged that CBM-I was not responsible for such deterioration.   
Figure 9. Participant three’s daily and mean anxiety and anxiety-bias scores across all 
phases. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. 
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immediate latency of change. There is also a decreasing trend of worry (decreasing worry) 
and a reduction in mean worry. In the follow-up phase there is a further reduction in mean 
worry and another downward shift in level of worry at the start, which then reverses and 
stabilises somewhat.   
 Overall there appears to be a notable improvement in worry scores both in terms of 
magnitude of change and rate of change in the CBM-I phase with gains appearing to 
maintain in the follow-up phase. Therefore this participant is classed as a responder and a 
maintainer. 
 Figure 10. Participant four’s (responder/maintainer) daily and mean worry scores across 
all phases. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
 
 3.2.4.2 Anxiety and anxiety-bias. 
 Visual inspection of figure 11 and Kendall’s tau analysis reveals anxiety (tau = -
.06, p = .87) and anxiety-bias (tau = .41, p = .25) to be relatively stable in the baseline 
phase with anxiety demonstrating a greater degree of fluctuation. In the CBM-I phase, 
mean anxiety and anxiety-bias reduce (improve), there is an upward shift in level of both at 
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the start followed by stabilisation and eventually a downward trend of scores indicating a 
delayed latency of change. In the follow-up phase there is an upward shift in level of 
anxiety at the start, no shift in level of anxiety-bias, and a further reduction in means of 
both. Greater stabilisation occurs with the beginnings of a possible upward trend at the end.  
 Overall there appears to be a reliable improvement in anxiety and anxiety-bias 
scores both in terms of magnitude of change and rate of change in the CBM-I phase. 
Although the penultimate anxiety score and the final anxiety-bias score indicate a sharp 
rise in the direction of deterioration, gains have maintained for the other six time points. 
Consequently it is judged that CBM-I has had a reliable effect on anxiety and anxiety-bias 
and that gains have maintained at follow-up for this participant. 
Figure 11. Participant four’s daily and mean anxiety and anxiety-bias scores across all 
phases. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. 
 
 3.2.5 Participant five. 
 3.2.5.1 Worry.  
 Visual inspection of figure 12 and Kendall’s tau analysis reveals a significant 
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decreasing trend in the baseline phase (tau = -.76, p = .005). In the CBM-I phase there is a 
reduction in mean worry with no shift in level of worry at the start and a latency of change 
of one day. Across the CBM-I phase the downward worry trend continues but at a faster 
rate (improvement accelerates). In the follow-up phase there is a further reduction in mean 
worry which then stabilises. Examination of level of change is not possible due to the 
missing final CBM-I phase data point.    
 Overall, although there appears to be an improvement in worry scores in the CBM-I 
phase and beyond, both in terms of magnitude of change and rate of change, it is judged as 
not being distinct enough from the significantly decreasing trend of the baseline phase to 
be deemed reliable. Therefore this participant is classed as a non-responder and therefore a 
non-maintainer.   
Figure 12. Participant five’s (non-responder/non-maintainer) daily and mean worry scores 
across all phases. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
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increasing trend of anxiety scores (tau = .8, p = .005) and a non-significant increasing 
trend of anxiety-bias scores (tau = .39, p = .19) in the baseline phase, although markedly 
less so for anxiety-bias. Across the CBM-I and follow-up phase there is little change in rate 
and of magnitude with regard anxiety-bias. In contrast, there is a dramatic downward shift 
in level of anxiety at the start of the CBM-I phase. This is followed by equally dramatic 
alternating upward and downward swings and eventual stabilisation in the follow-up phase 
with delayed latency of change.  
 Overall there appears to be no reliable change in anxiety-bias in the CBM-I and 
follow-up phases. With regard anxiety, despite the dramatic downward shift in level at the 
start of the CBM-I phase and the stabilising of reduced anxiety scores in the follow-up 
phase (which indicates a possible CBM-I effect) there is too much variability in the scores 
to allow a meaningful interpretation. Consequently the CBM-I is judged as not having a 
reliable effect on anxiety and anxiety-bias for this participant. 
Figure 13. Participant five’s daily and mean anxiety and anxiety-bias scores across all 
phases. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. 
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 3.2.6 Participant six. 
 3.2.6.1 Worry.  
 Visual inspection of figure 14 and Kendall’s tau analysis reveals a fluctuating but 
statistically stable baseline (tau = -.1, p = .76). In the CBM-I phase there is a reduction in 
mean worry with no shift in level of worry at the start. Latency of change cannot be 
examined due to a missing data point on the second day. Across the CBM-I phase there is a 
decreasing worry trend. In the follow-up phase there is a further reduction in mean worry 
and a downward shift of worry level at the start which then stabilises.  
 Overall there appears to be a reliable improvement in worry both in terms of 
magnitude of change and rate of change in the CBM-I phase and such gains appear to 
maintain generally in the follow-up phase. Therefore this participant is classed as a 
responder and a maintainer.   
Figure 14. Participant six’s (responder/maintainer) daily and mean worry scores across all 
phases. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire.  
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 3.2.6.2 Anxiety and anxiety-bias. 
 Visual inspection of figure 15 and Kendall’s tau analysis reveals fluctuating but 
statistically stable baselines for anxiety (tau = .11, p = .75) and anxiety-bias (tau = .0, p = 
1.0). In the CBM-I phase there is a marked reduction in mean anxiety and anxiety-bias, an 
immediate latency of change evidenced by a downward shift in level of both at the start 
(dramatically so for anxiety) and a decreasing trend of scores (indicating decreasing 
anxiety and anxiety-bias). In the follow-up phase there is a further reduction in mean worry 
and another downward shift in level of anxiety and anxiety-bias at the start which then 
stabilises.  
 Overall there appears to be a reliable improvement in anxiety and anxiety-bias 
scores both in terms of magnitude of change and rate of change in the CBM-I phase and 
such gains appear to maintain generally in the follow-up phase. Consequently it is judged 
that CBM-I has had a reliable effect on anxiety and anxiety-bias and that gains have 
maintained at follow-up for this participant. 
Figure 15. Participant six’s daily and mean anxiety and anxiety-bias scores across all 
phases. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. 
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 3.2.7 Participant seven. 
 3.2.7.1 Worry.  
 Visual inspection of figure 16 and Kendall’s tau analysis reveals a non-significant, 
increasing trend in the baseline phase (tau = .38, p = .10). In the CBM-I phase there is little 
change in mean worry, level or trend. In the follow-up phase there is very little change in 
mean, a small downward shift in level of worry at the start followed by an increasing trend 
of scores.  
 Overall there appears to be little change to worry scores in the CBM-I and    
follow-up phases therefore this participant is classed as a non-responder and also therefore 
a non-maintainer. 
 
Figure 16. Participant seven’s (non-responder/non-maintainer) daily and mean worry 
scores across all phases. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
 
 3.2.7.2 Anxiety and anxiety-bias. 
 Visual inspection of figure 17 and Kendall’s tau analysis reveals a stable     
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baseline (tau = .56, p = .02). In the CBM-I phase there is no shift in level at the start for 
each and little change in mean with both scores relatively stable. In the follow-up phase 
there is a greater reduction in mean for anxiety and anxiety-bias, a downward shift in both 
at the start with scores then fluctuating between upward and downward swings for the rest 
of the phase.  
 Overall there appears to be improvement in anxiety and anxiety-bias both in terms 
of rate of change and magnitude of change however it is somewhat delayed which makes 
interpretation difficult. Consequently the CBM-I is judged as not having a reliable effect 
on anxiety or anxiety-bias for this participant.        
 
Figure 17. Participant seven’s daily and mean anxiety and anxiety-bias scores across all 
phases. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. 
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can be said to occur when a participant moves from a score typical of an individual with 
GAD to a score typical of the non-disordered or normal population. Applying Jacobson 
and colleagues’ methodology, clinical significant change is determined on each measure by 
generating a cut-off point according to two different criterions:  
 1) The least arbitrary, termed criterion (c) is calculated where normative data is 
available on both GAD and ‘normal’ samples. Criterion (c) assesses whether the 
likelihood is greater that the participant’s score falls within the normal population. 
Calculation requires the means of a GAD sample (M1) and normal sample (M2), 
and the standard deviation (SD) of the GAD sample (S1) and normal sample (S2).  
The formula is:  
 criterion (c) = S1M2 + S2M1 
S1 + S2 
 
 
 2) Where normative data for normal samples is available, but normative data for 
GAD samples is not, criterion (b) is calculated. Criterion (b) assesses whether the 
participant has moved to within 2 SDs of the mean of the normal population. 
The formula is:  
 criterion (b) = M2 + 2(S2) 
 
 Where neither GAD samples nor normal population data is available on a measure, 
clinically significant change is said to occur if the participant moves from a score that lies 
above a recommended or widely used clinical cut-off at pre-CBM-I to one that lies below 
the cut-off at post CBM-I or follow-up.  
 Reliable change requires that improvement is statistically reliable and unlikely to 
be due to simple measurement unreliability. It is calculated using Jacobson & Truax’s 
(1991) reliable change index (RCI) and requires a reliability coefficient (r). 
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The formula is:  
RCI = 1.96 x (S1 ) x x (1 - r) 
  
 3.3.1 Worry.  
 3.3.1.1 Reliable and clinical change on the PSWQ. 
 Clinically significant and reliable change is determined using Fisher’s (2006) 
standardised criteria for recovery on the PSWQ (criterion (c), RCI = 7, cut-off point <47). 
Reliable change was achieved by three participants, all at post CBM-I and at follow-up 
(see table 3): participant four (responder/maintainer), participant five (non-responder/non-
maintainer) and participant six (responder/maintainer). No participants achieved clinical 
change.   
 
Table 3 
PSWQ Scores over the Four Time Points for each Participant 
Participant Pre-assessment Pre-CBM-I Post CBM-I Follow-up 
1 72 76 71 76 
2 65 75 79 76 
3 75 65 74 74 
4 76 72   56+    63+ 
5 75 71   62+    60+ 
6 74 69  56+    55+ 
7 72 76 74 79 
Note. PSWQ = The Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
*Indicates clinical change compared to pre-CBM-I. 
+ Indicates reliable change compared to pre-CBM-I.   
 
 3.3.2 General anxiety. 
 3.3.2.1 Reliable and clinical change on the GAD-7. 
 Clinically significant and reliable change is determined using reliability data 
(Cronbach α = 0.92), GAD sample data (Mean = 14.4, SD = 4.7) and normal sample data 
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(Mean = 4.9, SD = 4.8) from the original GAD-7 validation study (Spitzer et al., 2006). 
This generates a criterion (c) cut-off point of <9.8 and an RCI of 3.68. Reliable change was 
achieved by two participants: participant four at post CBM-I and at follow-up and 
participant one at follow-up only (see table 4). Clinical change was achieved by two 
participants: participant five at post CBM-I and participant one again at follow-up.    
 
Table 4 
GAD-7 Scores over the Four Time Points for each Participant 
Participant Pre-assessment Pre-CBM-I Post CBM-I Follow-up 
1 17 15 14      8*+ 
2 10 13 14 11 
3 16 14 16 16 
4 15 18    13+    10+ 
5 15 10      9* 11 
6 14 13  13 10 
7 12 17 16 18 
Note. GAD-7 = The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Assessment. 
* Indicates clinical change compared to pre-CBM-I. 
+ Indicates reliable change compared to pre-CBM-I.   
 
3.3.3 GAD. 
 3.3.3.1 Clinical change on the GAD-Q-IV. 
 The GAD-Q-IV is a GAD diagnostic measure and so reliable change is not 
calculated. Clinically significant change is determined using Newman et al’s (2002) 
recommended clinical cut-off of 5.7 (which the authors generated using receiver operating 
characteristics analyses). No participants achieved clinical change on this measure (see 
table 5).  
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Table 5 
GAD-Q-IV Scores over the Four Time Points for each Participant 
Participant Pre-assessment Pre-CBM-I Post CBM-I Follow-up 
1 11.67 11.42   11.67 11.33 
2 9.67 9.66  9.5 9.59 
3 10.16 10.66   10.33 11.25 
4 11.5 11.5   11.17 11 
5 10.58           10.92  10.5 8.83 
6 11 10.17 9.92 9.59 
7 9.91 12.17   9.92 10.16 
Note. GAD-Q-IV = The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire. 
* Indicates clinical change compared to pre-CBM-I. 
 
 3.3.4 Trait and state anxiety. 
 3.3.4.1 Reliable and clinical change on the STAI. 
 For trait anxiety, clinically significant and reliable change is determined using 
Fisher and Durham’s (1999) standardised criteria for recovery on the STAI-T (criterion (c), 
RCI = 8, cut-off point <46). 
 For state anxiety, due to a lack of available GAD sample data, clinically significant 
change is determined using criterion (b). Following the methodology of Fisher and 
Durham (1999), normal sample data from Spielberger et al. (1983) is collapsed across 
gender to generate a mean of 35.45 and an SD of 10.40. This produces a cut-off point of 
56.20. Reliable change is determined using the alpha coefficient of 0.93 from the same 
normative sample (Spielberger et al., 1983) which generates an RCI of 7.63.  
 On the STAI-T, three participants achieved reliable change: participant four at post 
CBM-I and follow-up, participant five at post CBM-I only and participant six at follow-up 
only (see table 6). Two participants achieved clinical change: participant two at post  
CBM-I and follow-up and participant six again at follow-up only. 
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Table 6 
STAI-T Scores over the Four Time Points for each Participant 
Participant Pre-assessment Pre-CBM-I Post CBM-I Follow-up 
1 74 62 59 56 
2 53 49  44*  43* 
3 61 52 56 59 
4 70 74   52+   61+ 
5 58         56   48+ 53 
6 58 56         53     44*+ 
7 53 58 61 63 
Note. STAI-T = The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait subscale 
* Indicates clinical change compared to pre-CBM-I. 
+ Indicates reliable change compared to pre-CBM-I.  
 
 
 On the STAI-S, five participants achieved reliable change (see table 7): four at post 
CBM-I and follow-up (participants two, four, five & six) and one at post CBM-I only 
(participant seven). Two participants achieved clinical change, both at post CBM-I and 
follow-up (participants four & seven again).  
 
Table 7 
STAI-S Scores over the Four Time Points for each Participant 
Participant Pre-assessment Pre-CBM-I Post CBM-I Follow-up 
1 61 52 46  56 
2 45 39 28+    22+ 
3 41 26 33  26 
4 78 65   47*+      54*+ 
5 33 50 38+    39+ 
6 43 48 32+    37+ 
7 38 61     42*+ 55* 
Note. STAI-S = The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-State subscale 
* Indicates clinical change compared to pre-CBM-I. 
+ Indicates reliable change compared to pre-CBM-I.  
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 3.3.5 Interpretation bias.  
 3.3.5.1 Change on the SST.  
 Reliable and clinical change cannot be calculated for the SST as it has not been 
validated as a measure. Nevertheless all but one participant (participant five) improved at 
post CBM-I and every participant improved at follow-up (see table 8).     
 
Table 8 
SST Scores over the Four Time Points for each Participant 
Participant Pre-assessment Pre-CBM-I Post CBM-I Follow-up 
1 43.75 44.44 25 25 
2 58.33 70 33.33 21.43 
3 8.33 10 0 6.25 
4 71.43 20 0 0 
5 42.86 43.75 55.56 35.71 
6 16.67 17.65  5 0 
7 52.94 80 40 45 
Note. SST = The Scrambled Sentences Test. 
Scores represent percentage of completed sentences with a negative valence.  
 
3.4 Imagery 
 At randomly pre-selected points within each block of ten scenarios, participants 
were required to rate how vividly they were able to imagine the previous scenario. A total 
mean was calculated for each participant (see table 9) and a Spearman’s Rho test assessed 
whether there was a relationship between imagery ratings and changes in PSWQ scores. 
The analysis revealed positive but non-significant correlations between mean imagery 
rating and: a) pre-CBM-I/post CBM-I PSWQ difference scores (rs= .34, p = .23) 
and b) pre-CBM-I/follow-up PSWQ difference scores (rs= .1, p = .42).  
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Table 9 
Mean Imagery Ratings for each Participant and if they Responded to the CBM-I 
Participant 
Mean Imagery 
Rating† 
Respond? 
1 6.97 No 
2 8.54 No 
3 7.26 No 
4 9.71 Yes 
5 8.29 No 
6 8.46 Yes 
7 8.54 No 
Note. † Higher scores indicate greater vividness of imagined scenarios (maximum score is 
10). 
 In addition, the mean imagery ratings of responders (Mean = 9.09, SD = 0.88) and 
non-responders (Mean = 7.92, SD = 0.75) were compared (see figure 18). A Mann-
Whitney test indicated that responders did not differ significantly in their imagery ratings 
to non-responders (U = 2.0, p = 0.38, r = 0.44).  
 
 
Figure 18. Mean imagery ratings for responders and non-responders 
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3.5 Statistical Analyses of Outcomes 
 Sample means for outcome measures at pre-assessment, pre-CBM-I, post CBM-I 
and follow-up are displayed in Table 10. All mean scores reduced from pre-CBM-I to post 
CBM-I and follow-up. To investigate whether the improvement was statistically 
significant, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were performed.  
 No significant differences were reported for any of the measures between           
pre-assessment and pre-CBM-I: PSWQ (z = -.43, p = .67, r = -.12); GAD-7  (z = -.26,        
p = .4, r = -.07); SST (z = -1.18, p = .24, r = -.32); STAI-T (z = -.93, p = .35, r = -.25); 
STAI-S (z = .0, p = .5, r = 0) and GAD-Q-IV (z = -.52, p = .3, r = -.14).  
 Significant reductions were found between pre-CBM-I and post CBM-I with large 
effect sizes on the SST (z = -2.03, p = .02, r = -.54), the GAD-Q-IV (z = -1.95, p = .03,      
r = -.52) and the STAI-S (z = -2.03, p = .02, r = -.54). Significant reductions with large 
effect sizes were also found between pre-CBM-I and follow-up on the SST (z = -2.37,       
p = .009, r = -.63) and STAI-S (z = -2.01, p = .02, r = -.54).   
 Therefore the study found that the group demonstrated reduced SST scores at the 
end of the CBM-I and that this maintained at one week follow-up, which supports the 
secondary research hypothesis.   
 No other significant differences were found at post CBM-I (PSWQ, z = -1.27,        
p = .1, r = -.34; GAD-7, z = -.65, p = .26, r = -.17; STAI-T, z = -1.34, p = .09, r = -.36) or 
follow-up (PSWQ, z = -.84, p = .2, r = -.22; GAD-7, z = -1.27, p = .1, r = -.34;           
GAD-Q-IV, z = -1.52, p = .06, r = -.41; STAI-T, z = -1.19, p = .12, r = -.32).   
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Table 10 
Mean Outcome Scores for Participants over the Four Time Points 
Measure Pre-assessment Pre-CBM-I Post CBM-I Follow-up 
PSWQ     
M 72.71 72 67.43 69 
SD 3.73 4.08 9.34 9.45 
GAD-7     
M 14.14 14.29 13.57 12 
SD 2.41 2.69 2.37 3.61 
STAI-T     
M 61 58.14 53.29 54.14 
SD 8.12 8.13 5.99 7.97 
STAI-S     
M 48.43 48.71 38 41.29 
SD 15.68 13.16 7.33 14.12 
GAD-Q-IV     
M 10.64 10.93 10.43 10.25 
SD 0.78 0.85 0.76 0.97 
SST     
M 42.04 40.83 22.7 19.06 
SD 22.48 26.86 21.76 17.71 
Note. PSWQ = The Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GAD-7 = The Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder Assessment; STAI-T = The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait 
subscale; STAI-S = The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-State subscale;     
GAD-Q-IV = The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire; SST = The Scrambled 
Sentences Test.   
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Discussion  
4.1 Overview 
 The chapter begins with a restatement of the aims of the study. This is followed by 
a discussion of the findings in relation to the research hypotheses, the literature, and 
theory. Where results do not support the research hypotheses, possible explanations are 
considered. Next, methodological limitations are identified and future research 
recommendations are suggested. The chapter completes with a discussion of the potential 
clinical implications of the findings and a conclusion.    
4.2 Aims of the Study 
 The primary aim of the present study was to investigate whether an online       
multi-session CBM-I package would positively impact on the level of worry in individuals 
experiencing clinical levels of generalised anxiety and whether any benefits would last one 
week after CBM-I completion. The secondary aim was to investigate whether such 
individuals would experience positive change in their level of negative interpretation bias 
and whether this too would maintain one week later. 
4.3 Primary Research Hypothesis  
 The first research hypothesis predicted that the CBM-I training task would reduce 
levels of worry and that this would be maintained at one week follow-up. The present 
study found mixed support for this hypothesis.  
 In support of the primary research hypothesis, visual inspection of daily PSWQ 
scores indicated that two of the seven participants demonstrated a reliable positive 
response to the CBM-I and that their gains had maintained one week later (participants 
four & six – ‘responders’ & ‘maintainers’). Furthermore, participants four and six, and one 
other participant (participant five), satisfied Jacobson and colleagues’ (1984, 1991) criteria 
for reliable improvement on the PSWQ upon completion of the CBM-I and one week later. 
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No participants achieved clinically significant change on this measure.  
 As is routine in CBM-I research, anxiety was also assessed (MacLeod & Mathews, 
2012). Visual inspection of daily anxiety VAS scores indicated that two participants 
reliably responded to the CBM-I and that their gains maintained for one week (participants 
four & six).  
 Additional anxiety measures were given at the four assessment time points of pre-
assessment, pre-CBM-I, post CBM-I and follow-up. On the GAD-7, which is a measure of 
general anxiety, one participant demonstrated a reliable change which maintained at 
follow-up (participant four), and one other participant demonstrated reliable and clinical 
change on the GAD-7 at follow-up only (participant one). Only one participant 
demonstrated clinically significant change on the GAD-7, which was at post-CBM-I 
(participant five). On the GAD-Q-IV, only clinically significant change was assessed and 
no participants achieved this. On the STAI-T, a measure of trait anxiety, three participants 
demonstrated reliable change: participant four at post CBM-I and follow-up, participant 
five at post CBM-I only, and participant six at follow-up only. Two participants 
demonstrated clinically significant change on the STAI-T: participant two at post CBM-I 
and follow-up and participant six at follow-up only. Most improvements occurred on the 
STAI-S, a measure of state anxiety. Five participants demonstrated reliable change on the 
STAI-S at post CBM-I (participants two, four, five, six & seven) and for four of them this 
maintained at follow-up (participants two, four, five & six). Clinically significant change 
on the STAI-S was demonstrated by two of the participants, at both time points 
(participants four & seven). 
 Supplementing these findings, statistical analyses showed that none of the change 
observed on the PSWQ was significant (post CBM-I, p = .1; follow-up, p = .2). With 
regard anxiety, statistically significant improvement was found on two of the outcomes: 
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the GAD-Q-IV at post CBM-I (p = .03) and the STAI-S at both post CBM-I (p = .02) and 
follow-up (p = .02).  
 These findings are relatively weak compared to several previous studies that have 
investigated CBM-I on emotionality. Positive effects of CBM-I on worry have been 
observed in non-clinical high worriers (Hirsch et al., 2009) and GAD patients (Hayes et al., 
2010).  Other studies have found bias modification training to positively impact on trait 
and state anxiety (e.g., Brosan et al., 2011; Salemink et al., 2009). Furthermore reductions 
in trait anxiety have been observed one week following training (e.g., Mathews et al., 
2007), and later (e.g., Amir & Taylor, 2012a). Possible explanations for the mixed findings 
in the present study are considered below in Theoretical considerations.  
 In sum, the findings show that the CBM-I package had variable success in reducing 
participants’ worry over the training week and the week that followed. Consequently the 
efficacy of the CBM-I package for individuals with clinical levels of generalised anxiety is 
equivocal: it would appear that some individuals may benefit from it but that many, 
perhaps most, will not.  
4.4 Secondary Research Hypothesis 
 The second research hypothesis predicted that participants would demonstrate a 
reduction in level of negative interpretation bias and that this would be maintained at one 
week follow-up. The present study mainly found support for this hypothesis. 
 All but one of the participants (participant five) demonstrated reduced SST scores 
at post CBM-I, and at follow-up all SST scores were reduced. Statistical analysis revealed 
these reductions to be significant (post CBM-I, p = .02; follow-up, p = .009). These results 
suggest that training was associated with improved interpretive bias upon completion of 
the CBM-I programme and one week later. This finding is consistent with Brosan et al. 
(2011) and Hayes et al. (2010) who used GAD samples. The finding that interpretation bias 
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remained reduced one week later is consistent with other studies using anxious samples 
(e.g., Amir & Taylor, 2012a; Bowler et al., 2012).  
 In addition to measuring interpretation bias, a typical anxiety bias was also 
assessed; specifically the tendency to expect the worse. Visual inspection of daily    
anxiety-bias VAS scores indicated that three participants (participants two, four & six) 
experienced reliable reductions in this particular bias and that this maintained for all three 
of them one week later. 
  Whereas CBM-I training only appeared to reduce worry levels for two participants 
at its conclusion and one week later (participants four & six), significant effects were 
found across participants on interpretation bias at both time points. Although the present 
study is unable to infer whether the CBM-I programme was the cause of the interpretive 
bias improvements, the findings are consistent with the possibility that CBM-I can induce a 
more benign interpretive bias in individuals experiencing clinical levels of generalised 
anxiety.  
4.5 The Role of Imagery 
 The CBM-I protocol in the present study included a notable imagery component. 
Prior to their first CBM-I session participants received guidance by the researcher on how 
to adopt a field perspective when visualising the scenarios. In addition, participants were 
provided with instructions at the beginning of each CBM-I session and during it they were 
required to frequently rate how vividly they were able to imagine the scenarios. In line 
with research by Holmes and colleagues (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009), it was predicted that 
placing emphasis on the need for participants to imagine themselves in the scenarios would 
enhance the effectiveness of the CBM-I task.  
 The results show that there was a non-significant positive correlation between 
imagery self report ratings and changes in PSWQ scores from pre-CBM-I to post CBM-I 
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and follow-up. It was also found that the mean imagery rating of responders was higher 
than of the non-responders however the difference was not significant. Whilst these results 
indicate that the success of the CBM-I task in reducing worry was not related to how 
vividly participants imagined the training scenarios, the lack of a non-imagery matched 
control group and the small number of participants, particularly responders, means that 
such findings should be considered with caution (Field, 2005).  
4.6 Theoretical Considerations 
 CBM-I training is predicated on a fundamental cognitive theory assumption that 
pathological worry, like anxiety, is maintained in part by cognitive biases in emotional 
processing, such as the tendency to interpret ambiguous information in a negative manner 
(Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). Moreover it is assumed that modification of interpretation bias 
should impact on levels of worry by reducing it. Therefore in light of the improvements 
observed in interpretation bias, a pure CBM-I explanation would be that the CBM-I task’s 
modus operandi of repeatedly requiring participants to generate benign interpretations of 
ambiguous imagined scenarios reduced their negative interpretation bias (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000). According to Mathews and Mackintosh (2000), through CBM-I 
training participants may implicitly acquire an interpretation rule that without explicit 
awareness or intent they apply to novel situations, which includes bias manipulation 
checks such as the SST.  
 The finding that some of these participants also reported less worry (participants 
four & six - responders)  is consistent with information processing models which would 
predict that a reduction in worry would occur as a result of interpretation bias modification 
(e.g., Beck et al., 1985; Bower et al., 1983). For instance, in line with Beck’s schema 
model (e.g., Beck et al., 1985), the improvement demonstrated by responders could be 
attributed to the CBM-I task successfully modifying their maladaptive schemata. That is, 
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the responders’ schemas became less distorted in their processing of information as 
dangerous which then resulted in less negative automatic thoughts associated with threat. 
Or, drawing on Bower’s network theory (Bower et al., 1983), the CBM-I might have lead 
to the deactivating of anxiety nodes within semantic memory resulting in less priming for 
threat information. 
 Alternatively the CBM-I task may have lead to a reduction in worry in the 
responders by adjusting the balance between bottom-up and top-down processes, as 
conceptualised by the information processing model of pathological worry (Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012). More specifically, when the responders encountered an external or 
internal cue of some potential threat in their daily lives outside of the training sessions, 
their representation of threat may have activated less than occurred pre-CBM-I. The model 
would indicate that this was due to less activation of involuntary bottom-up influences, 
namely interpretation bias. Consequently the responders would have been less likely to 
experience intrusions of negative thoughts into awareness, the overall effect being less 
protracted worry.  
 Qualitative feedback was obtained from all participants with the exception of 
participant six (responder) of which example quotes, organised into different themes, can 
be found in Appendix Q. Consistent with her reliable ‘response’ to the CBM-I as indicated 
by the PSWQ, participant four (responder) reported experiencing positive cognitive as well 
as behavioural change e.g. ‘these thoughts go in your head but now I, I am thinking of 
positive rather than negative’.  
 The qualitative feedback concerning change perceived by the non-responders was 
mostly concordant with their visually inspected PSWQ scores. Participants three and seven 
for instance described gaining no benefits. The notable exception was participant one (non-
responder) who’s qualitative feedback indicated improvements not captured by her PSWQ 
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scores. For example participant one described significant adaptive shifts in cognition (e.g., 
‘I’ve just decided to try and start sort of living my life rather than being scared of it’) and 
behaviour, including less avoidance  (e.g., ‘I’ve booked a holiday for next year to go 
abroad with the two children in the last week which is something which terrifies me’).   
 Qualitative feedback notwithstanding the case remains that the CBM-I training did 
not appear to impact on worry for most of the participants despite significant reductions 
indicated in negative interpretation bias for the sample as a whole. Before considering why 
this may have occurred, it is important to note that such findings are not unusual within 
CBM-I research. Other studies have also found results concerning the effect of CBM-I on 
anxiety and other emotional outcomes to be more mixed than interpretation bias (Amir et 
al., 2010; Beard & Amir., 2008; MacDonald et al., 2013; Murphy et al., 2007; Steinman & 
Teachman, 2010). 
 In hypothesising why CBM-I failed to have an impact on five participants’ worry 
and daily anxiety in the present study (participants one, two, three, five & seven), the 
nature of the training procedure adopted warrants consideration. One possibility is that the 
amount of CBM-I training was not sufficient to positively impact upon emotion and that 
with more training there might have been more responders. In line with such reasoning, 
three participants provided feedback that they thought extending the CBM-I training would 
be helpful (participants one, three & six). Interestingly studies by Beard et al. (2011) and 
Amir and Taylor (2012a) included bias modification training that spanned notably longer 
periods than the present study and both were associated with reductions in anxiety. In the 
study by Beard and colleagues, training consisted of eight 30 minutes sessions that took 
place twice weekly, over a month, and in Amir and Taylor’s study participants underwent 
12 x 20 minute sessions over a six week period.  
 However Hayes et al. (2010) and Brosan et al. (2011) found effects on emotional 
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outcomes in their GAD samples after less training sessions than in the present study. 
Brosan et al. (2011) reported reduced state and trait anxiety in their participants after they 
had received two and half hours of training over four sessions and Hayes et al. (2010) 
found that just a single session was enough to reduce worry in their participants. Similarly 
Hirsch et al. (2009) found that their non-clinical high worriers benefitted from a single 
session of training, as have other non-clinically anxious participants in other studies (e.g., 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).  
 Whilst such findings indicate that the extent of CBM-I training in the present study 
should have been enough to produce a response it is worth considering that there are 
important differences in the training tasks used. In the other studies looking at CBM-I and 
worry (Hirsch et al., 2009) and GAD (Brosan et al., 2011; Hayes et al., 2010), training 
consisted of dual modification tasks  i.e. two different bias modification procedures, 
whereas in the present study training consisted solely of the ambiguous scenarios 
paradigm. Additionally, previous studies have assessed training effects on worry by way of 
participants reporting the number of thought intrusions experienced during a breathing 
focus task (Hayes et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2009). This is very different to participants 
completing the PSWQ, a psychometrically verified measure of pathological worry for 
between 21 and 25 days as occurred in the present study. Consequently, it is difficult to 
conclude whether the five non-responders (participants one, two, three, five, & seven) were 
influenced by the schedule of training not being sufficient to modify worry. Taken 
together, and considering the pervasiveness of GAD (Hanrahan et al., 2013), it seems fair 
to propose that longer training may be necessary.     
 Another possibility is that the CBM-I task itself, or at least some aspect of it, may 
benefit from being redesigned. The ambiguous scenarios paradigm is the most commonly 
used interpretation bias modification procedure and is associated with positive outcomes 
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(Beard, 2011). It is important to consider that although the basic format of the task adopted 
in the present study was consistent with previous research (e.g., Bowler et al., 2012; 
Salemink et al., 2009; Steinman & Teachman, 2010) the training scenarios were more 
unique. Following the studies of Hayes et al. (2010) and Hirsch et al. (2009), the scenarios 
were designed by the researcher to represent common worry topics as identified in the 
WDQ. It therefore remains possible that some or many of the scenarios were not perceived 
as believable, personally relevant or potentially anxiety provoking to some of the 
participants. This would in all likelihood reduce their level of engagement with the task 
and inhibit the deployment of their interpretive bias.    
 Active engagement within CBM-I training has been shown to be a crucial factor in 
determining its success on anxiety vulnerability. In support, Mathews and Mackintosh 
(2000) developed a passive CBM-I procedure whereby participants received 
disambiguated scenarios rather than having to actively generate them. They found that in 
this passive procedure anxiety was not affected. This contrasted with the reduced anxiety 
observed in their active condition in which participants had to resolve the ambiguity 
themselves. The researchers proposed that in order for participants to achieve emotional 
modification from CBM-I, they must take ownership of generating emotional meanings. 
Mathews and MacLeod (2002) argued that only through active generation will participants 
learn the crucial implicit production rule to generate and select benign or positive 
meanings when they encounter and process ambiguous events in their daily lives. 
Confirmation of this hypothesis comes from studies that have found active but not passive 
selection of meaning to increase emotionality (Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 
2010a; Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010b).  
 The success of the CBM-I program for each participant may therefore have been 
influenced by issues relating to level of engagement. Qualitative feedback tended to be 
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consistent with this notion. Of those interviewed, the two participants who reported the 
most positive change (participants one & four) appeared to find the scenarios personally 
relevant to their worries and emotionally engaging. For example participant one reported ‘a 
lot of the erm, situations in it were very similar to the situations I find myself in or I’m 
scared of’.  In contrast, the two participants who described the least change (participants 
three & seven) did not appear to engage well with the scenarios, for example participant 
seven reported ‘I was looking at the questions it was asking me and I’d think about myself 
in that situation and it’s that ninety percent of those situations would never worry me 
anyway’.  
 A similar divide existed between participants over their attitude towards the CBM-I 
program. The two participants who reported the most change and who appeared to find the 
scenarios most emotionally engaging (participants one & four) appeared to have the most 
positive attitude towards the CBM-I whereas the two participants who found the scenarios 
least engaging and whom reported the least change (participants three & seven) appeared 
to have the least positive attitude towards it. For example, participant one reported ‘the 
idea behind it is, is good and I think it will make a difference to people’ whereas 
participant three reported ‘I think it’s better to have a person, personally, rather than a 
computer program’. Therefore within the qualitative feedback there appears to be a 
relationship between perceived improvement, emotional engagement with the scenarios 
and attitude towards the CBM-I task. 
 Interestingly, Bendelin, Hesser, Dahl, Carlbring, Nelson and Andersson (2011) 
report similar patterns within their qualitative data. They explored participants’ views of an 
internet administrated cCBT and found that it was appraised differently depending on 
outcome and that those who had issues with the treatment material were less positive in 
their appraisals and reported less favourable outcomes. Also Curtis (2013) found that if 
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adolescent participants stated that they enjoyed their CBM-I task, then this was linked to 
positive outcomes in relation to symptomatology and interpretation bias.  
 It is also possible that other factors such as motivation could have influenced the 
extent of meaningful engagement with, and impact of, the CBM-I task for participants. 
Regardless of what these factors may be, limited task engagement could be why some 
participants, namely non-responders minus participant one, appeared to gain little if any 
benefit from the CBM-I task. As a consequence of this they would not have obtained 
sufficient practice in the active generation of emotional resolutions even though they were 
able to provide correct word fragment solutions. This would have meant that their ability to 
generate benign emotional resolutions in their daily lives remain relatively unchanged and 
so therefore their proclivity to worry. 
 This obviously does not account for why participant one, who appeared to engage 
well with the task, did not demonstrate an improvement in worry level, despite reporting 
various positive changes in thinking and behaviour. However it is worth noting that this 
participant reported a significant family related stressor occurring during the CBM-I phase 
which she said was increasing her worrying. Therefore one possibility, although purely 
speculative, is that her worry level, whilst not notably reduced, was less than it would have 
been had this stressful event occurred prior to her CBM-I training. 
 With regard the participants’ improved SST scores, interestingly, passive 
engagement with CBM-I can still give the impression of interpretation bias modification 
(Hertel & Mathews, 2012). Hoppitt et al. (2010b) proposed that in passive training 
participants experience some kind of training-congruent generic emotional priming. The 
effects of this generic priming can resemble interpretive bias modification, for example, 
CBM-I trained participants may show a tendency to endorse positive interpretations which 
are offered to them (e.g., Grey & Mathews, 2000). It is important to note that the present 
  
100 
 
study is not aware of active and passive procedures being compared in clinical samples, 
who may behave differently.  Nonetheless in the present study, it is possible that the 
reduced scores at post CBM-I and follow-up may have reflected training induced priming 
as much as, perhaps even more than, genuine interpretive bias modification. This might 
explain why in the present study, there appeared to be greater improvement in 
interpretation bias than for worry. The implication is that participants could have selected 
benign interpretations on the SST not necessarily because they experienced generalisable 
erosion to their level of negative interpretation bias but because the CBM-I primed them to 
do so. 
 Priming alone, however, is unlikely to fully account for the improvement in SST 
scores as despite similarities in the demands required by the CBM-I and the SST, they are 
ultimately different tasks. The CBM-I required solutions to benignly valenced word 
fragments and the selecting of benign meanings (comprehension question). The SST on the 
other hand required generation, albeit restricted to two possible options, of benignly 
valenced sentences. As such, the SST can be considered an independent measure (Standage 
et al., 2010) and its inclusion therefore a strength of this study. The SST also contained a 
cognitive load which means that a response bias is less likely (Bowler et al., 2012). So in 
considering why it was that most participants appeared to demonstrate greater 
improvement in interpretation bias than in worry and anxiety from post CBM-I to follow-
up, it may be that, for whatever reason, most did not actively engage with the CBM-I 
enough for training to generalise. Because of this it did not impact on emotionality, 
although completing the scenarios was nonetheless sufficient to achieve a reduction in 
assessed interpretation bias.  
 Interestingly in other studies that have also included independent measures of 
interpretation bias change, results have been mixed regarding generalisation, with some 
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finding evidence in support (e.g., Hayes et al., 2010; Mathews et al., 2007; Standage et al., 
2010) and others not finding support (e.g., Salemink et al., 2007; Salemink et al., 2009; 
Salemink et al., 2010; Steinman & Teachman, 2009). Beard (2011) noted that these 
inconclusive findings suggest that CBM-I may not change cognition in real-life situations. 
However, Beard also suggested that this is likely related to the inherent difficulties 
involved in measuring interpretative processes in real world situations. Indication that 
CBM-I training effects can transfer to people’s lives comes from studies that have found 
evidence of generalisation when a stressor task has been included (e.g., Beard et al., 2011; 
Clerkin & Teachman, 2011; Hirsch et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2006). Further support for 
this comes from studies in which interpretation bias change has been found to mediate the 
effect of CBM-I on symptom severity (e.g., Hayes et al., 2010; Mathews et al., 2007).  
 In sum, the observation that five of the participants in the current study did not 
appear to derive notable benefit in their level of worry after starting CBM-I training 
(participants one, two, three, five & seven) is not totally disparate from the CBM literature 
base. One possible suggestion is that the degree of active meaningful engagement within 
the CBM-I task may be a critical factor, which could be related to how personally relevant 
the scenarios are perceived to be amongst other factors.   
4.7 A Methodological Critique and Consideration for Future Research 
 The results of the present study should be considered in the context of a 
methodological critique. On balance, the study design employed offered an effective 
means of investigating the main research hypotheses. The single-case design has been 
considered an appropriate method to evaluate potential interventions that are at an early 
stage of clinical testing (Kazdin, 2011), which is the case for CBM-I, particularly with 
regard GAD (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). Flyvbjerg (1994) advocates that the single-case 
design is an underutilized, important research method and one which the social sciences 
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would benefit from having more of. According to Flyvbjerg, single-case research has 
advantages over large sample quantitative methodologies such as being able to offer 
greater closeness to real life, greater depth of phenomenon studied and more concrete, 
practical (context dependent) knowledge.  
 The non-concurrent, multiple-baseline aspect of the design meant that participants 
could start the study as soon as they wanted to, without delay, whilst awaiting treatment.  
Ethically this was positive as it meant that there was no disruption to participants’ clinical 
care to referring clinical teams.   
 The study design adopted also has some intrinsic drawbacks. Probably the most 
obvious limitation concerns the generalisability of the results (Barlow, Nock, & Hersen, 
2009). The small sample size of seven participants is relatively typical for a single-case 
series (Kazdin, 2011), however this invariably limits how much can be inferred from the 
findings to other individuals experiencing clinical levels of generalised anxiety. In 
addition, by virtue of the single-case design, the study cannot explain why the CBM-I task 
appeared to be effective for some participants but not others (Kazdin, 2011).  
 With regard the method of data evaluation used in the present study, in accordance 
with single-case methodology, the effect of the CBM-I task on worry, and also anxiety, 
was assessed through visual inspection of the data. Therefore the decision as to whether or 
not participants responded to the CBM-I or not was a subjective one (Kazdin, 2011). 
However in an attempt to make this evaluation as systematic and objective as possible, 
Kazdin’s (2011) criteria for visual inspection was implemented.   
 As for judging whether or not an effect had occurred, this task was not straight 
forward for a number of reasons. Firstly, most of the participants demonstrated instability 
in at least one of their baselines (participants two, three, five & seven). Moreover, for 
almost half of the participants (participants two, three & five), at least one of their 
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baselines showed improvement. Such baseline issues are not uncommon to single-case 
research (Kazdin, 2011) and made for difficult interpretation as to whether or not the 
CBM-I phase surpassed the projected baseline trajectory. Secondly, the high variability in 
VAS scores for some participants made assessing responses for anxiety and anxiety-bias 
challenging. Thirdly, the absence of dramatic changes or what has been referred to as ‘slam 
bang’ effects (Gilbert, Light, & Mosteller, 1975) observed between the baseline and  
CBM-I phases across the sample needs to be considered when interpreting the findings. 
 Consequently, there was opportunity for error when evaluating whether or not the 
CBM-I produced an effect for the participants, which is always a risk when visual 
inspection is adopted (Kazdin, 2011). The risk of error was probably greater in the judging 
of whether or not a participant was a maintainer as the parameters were less defined and 
there wasn’t systematic criteria to guide decisions. According to Kazdin (2011), visual 
inspection is typically associated with greater risk of assuming effects where there are none 
(type 2 error) as even if an effect is real, if it is not eye catching or clear then it is likely to 
be overlooked. This insensitivity to weak effects means that reliable but weak effects can 
be easily missed (Kazdin, 2011). It is therefore possible that there were actually more 
instances of CBM-I effects in the present study than was detected. To reduce subjectivity 
and error, the present study’s inspection was reviewed by the primary research supervisor. 
In future studies, to improve data evaluation, it could be helpful to recruit independent 
trained researchers to perform visual inspection on the daily outcomes (Kazdin, 2011).  
 A strength of the multiple-baseline single case design is that it provides some 
control for threats to internal validity such as maturation and testing (Kazdin, 2011). 
However it is possible that confounding, non-specific aspects of the CBM-I phase could 
have increased the chances of a response occurring. For instance, the introduction of 
something active, structured and potentially rewarding into their lives (i.e., the CBM-I 
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task), could increase self-mastery, self-esteem and mood which might positively impact on 
worry. With that said, the opposite could also be true; that the CBM-I task was an added 
stressor which could have elevated worry. This difference in appraising the CBM-I task 
may explain some of the variability in findings.  
 In consideration of the reduction in state anxiety, there was a degree of contact 
between the researcher and participants, most of which was face to face. It is possible that 
participants could have become increasingly comfortable and relaxed with the researcher’s 
presence with subsequent appointments. With regard the other non-daily outcome 
measures, the contact also meant that there was potential for the participants to experience 
empathy, warmth, unconditional regard and understanding despite the concerted efforts of 
the researcher to remain as neutral as possible. All of these relationship related factors 
facilitate the construction of a therapeutic alliance; a core psychotherapy process which has 
been shown to contribute to treatment gains (e.g., Stiles, Shapiro, & Elliot, 1986). 
Nevertheless the lack of significance found between scores at pre-assessment and          
pre-CBM-I on any of the non-daily outcome measures suggests that the instances of 
improvement cannot be fully accounted for by a testing bias. Furthermore, in spite of the 
potential for bias in the present study, findings on worry and anxiety outcomes were 
generally weak which if anything indicates that if bias had an effect, it wasn’t notable. To 
help eliminate potential researcher effects it would be important to reduce the amount of 
contact between them in future research. It may be helpful if all communication is via 
email and text messages and the researcher’s telephone contact provided only as an 
emergency number.  
 A key strength of this study is the inclusion of an interpretation bias measure. A 
general problem within the CBM-I research base is the lack of a psychometrically verified 
interpretation bias measure (Beard, 2011). The choice was even more limited for the 
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present study as most were originally developed for measuring social anxiety related 
interpretation bias and have been used primarily to detect between group differences where 
there is also a control group. Examples include the word sentence association paradigm 
(Beard & Amir, 2008), the recognition task (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) and the 
ASSIQ (Stopa & Clark, 2000). Consequently the SST was deemed as the most appropriate 
interpretive bias assessment that is currently available. Efforts were taken to enhance its 
validity and reliability in the present study which included using the WDQ as a guide for 
the sentences, obtaining approval from two independent Clinical Psychologists, and 
randomising the order of sentences for each participant at each time point. Future research 
aimed at the development of a psychometrically robust interpretation bias measure which 
is relevant to GAD would be useful.  
 There were also some potential limitations with some of the other measures used in 
this study. Following Blackwell and Holmes (2010), a daily measure of a typical cognitive 
bias was included, which in the present study was an anxiety bias pertaining to 
catastrophisation. However this outcome was less defined than the others and did not 
closely relate to the research hypotheses. Replacing this measure with perhaps a daily 
mood measure could be advantageous in future research given that depression is often    
co-morbid with GAD (Yonkers et al., 1996). Although adopting the present study design 
would not be able to offer any further clarification of the relationship between the CBM-I 
task, mood and worry, given that all but one of the participants scored in the clinical range 
of depression at assessment (participant five), any improvements in mood would be 
valuable and of clinical interest.  
 The use of the GAD-Q-IV as an assessor of the presence of clinical levels of 
generalised anxiety was appropriate however its additional use as an outcome measure to 
detect changes in generalised anxiety severity was less so as it was not designed for this 
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purpose. Similar issues pertain to the suitability of the PSWQ as an assessor of daily worry 
change. Whilst the PSWQ has demonstrated good responsiveness to changes in worry level 
over periods of several weeks and longer (e.g., Borkovec & Costello, 1993; Borkovec, 
Newman, Pincus, & Lytle, 2002), it contains several characteristic worry statements 
undermining its suitability to monitor daily fluctuations (Stober & Bittencourt, 1998). 
Substituting the PSWQ for a measure of worry that is designed to assess daily change such 
as the Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Past Day (Joos et al., 2011) may allow more effects 
of worry to emerge. Nevertheless the present study is not aware of any other CBM-I 
studies that have included a standardised measure of worry and so the inclusion of the 
PSWQ is a strength.   
 With regard the CBM-I task, as mentioned already, most of the scenarios were 
developed by the researcher in accordance to common worry topics as identified in the 
WDQ. They were also trialled on a Trainee Clinical Psychologist and, just like with the 
SST, the final set were submitted to and approved for applicability to GAD by two Clinical 
Psychologists. Nonetheless it was not possible to ensure that the scenarios fit with the 
participants’ main sources of worry. To enhance their effectiveness, a similar iterative 
approach to that used by Blackwell and Holmes (2010) could be adopted in which the 
CBM-I task evolved according to the feedback of each successive participant. The fact that 
the present study’s CBM-I task consisted of seven sessions, had a notable imagery aspect, 
was administered online, and accessed by participants in their homes means that it could be 
considered progressive.    
 The present study was unable to fully assess for the participants’ compliance to the 
CBM-I task although data was gathered on whether or not participants fully completed 
sessions or not and encouragingly every participant did. Capturing data on word fragment 
and comprehension accuracy would be helpful in future research as it would allow more 
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insight into their level of engagement with the CBM-I task.   
 Finally the sample used in the current study consisted of patients referred from 
psychological services who scored above the clinical threshold on a GAD screening 
questionnaire (GAD-Q-IV). The fact that people with clinical presentations were studied is 
useful as this is generally lacking in the CBM research (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). At 
assessment all participants reported to have experienced excessive, uncontrollable worry 
about multiple worry topics on more days than not for at least six months. They also all 
scored above the clinical thresholds on the STAI-T, the GAD-7 and the PSWQ. These 
results increase the chances that they had diagnosable GAD however this was not assessed 
using a structured diagnostic interview. Consequently the participants are representative of 
treatment seeking individuals experiencing clinical levels of generalised anxiety not 
individuals with GAD. To enhance the generalisability of findings to GAD, future research 
should use an approved diagnostic tool such as the Anxiety and Related Disorders 
Interview Schedule for DSM-5-Lifetime Version (ADIS-5L; Brown & Barlow, 2014) to 
screen participants. To further explore how long treatment gains last for with this CBM-I 
task, with this population, the inclusion of additional follows-up beyond one week post 
CBM-I would be interesting. 
 The limitations and weaknesses associated with the present study could be 
addressed by a larger, group controlled study like an RCT. For instance, with a control 
condition, it would be possible to investigate the direct effect of CBM-I on negative 
interpretation bias and help to eliminate non-bias modification explanations of training 
effects. It would also be possible to compare the CBM-I package with other established 
low intervention CT-based approaches and to directly test the benefit of the task’s 
enhanced imagery component for this population. However despite the potential 
advantages of carrying out an RCT, the results of the present study do not indicate that one 
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is warranted with the CBM-I program in its current form. Rather, more development is 
needed with this paradigm to enhance its effect with this population. Small scale studies, 
like the current one, are therefore appropriate at this moment in time.  
 Qualitative feedback indicates some ideas to be tested out in future research that 
might improve the potency of the CBM-I task for reducing pathological worry. Firstly, 
extending the time frame over which the CBM-I sessions take place, as suggested by 
participants one, three and five could be efficacious. Psychological interventions such as 
therapy often occur weekly therefore a more longitudinal CBM-I program might allow 
better consolidation of the implicit production rule necessary for training effects to transfer 
to real life (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012) and facilitate more enduring bias modification. 
Secondly, ensuring the scenarios are perceived as personally meaningful and congruent 
with the participant’s own main worries could be beneficial. It was clear that the two 
participants who described the least benefit from their CBM-I experience did not think that 
the scenarios were relevant to their worries (participants three & seven). For example 
participant seven reported ‘I think it’s, for me it wasn’t very beneficial but I think for some 
people it would be if they worry about those situations a lot’. The impression gained from 
this participant’s feedback is that the scenarios are appraised as important in determining 
outcomes for others and that with greater concordance to personal worries, gains might be 
possible.   
 Quite how the matching of scenarios to individuals can best be achieved is unclear. 
One idea could be to tailor scenarios according to the participant’s main topics of worry. 
The first necessary step in achieving this would be for individuals to undergo an 
assessment prior to CBM-I to help identify what they worry most about. The next step 
would involve creating an individualised training set consisting of scenarios that are most 
relevant to their worries. For example, if a participant reports that they worry most about 
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their finances and work but less so relationships, then their allocated scenarios could reflect 
this. Creating a larger database of scenarios that could be categorised into specific domains 
of worry, that goes beyond the WDQ, would be useful as it would allow CBM-I users to 
receive hopefully a more tightly matched training set.   
 Whilst a one size fits all approach has clearly demonstrated efficacy in CBM-I 
studies (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012), most of these have targeted social anxiety (Beard, 
2011). Social anxiety, by definition, involves a specific type of anxiety.  Because of this, 
one might expect less variability between sufferers of this disorder in terms of the types of 
scenarios that trigger their anxiety (i.e. primarily social situations) than would be the case 
for GAD sufferers whose anxiety triggers are, by definition, more wide ranging. 
Consequently the chances of scenario mismatch occurring may be greater for GAD and so 
a one size fits all approach may be less effective with this particular disorder.  
  In sum, increasing emotional engagement with the training materials would appear 
to be critical. Based on participant feedback, future research should consider creating and 
testing a more individualised CBM-I program.  
4.8 Clinical Implications 
 The current study found that an online multi-session CBM-I task was able to reduce 
level of worry in two individuals presenting with clinical levels of generalised anxiety 
(participants four & six). In addition, the group as a whole demonstrated reduced negative 
interpretation bias one week after completion of CBM-I. Therefore the CBM-I task may 
hold potential as a clinical tool for pathological worry. This notion is consistent with other 
studies that have included GAD participants and observed CBM-I benefits (Brosan et al., 
2011; Hayes et al., 2010).  
There are many reasons to be optimistic about the clinical application of CBM-I. 
As Beard (2011) noted, CBM-I has many advantageous unique features: Firstly, it lends 
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itself to standardised computer delivery, is relatively brief, and non-invasive for patients. 
Secondly, it is cost efficient as it requires no therapy contact. Thirdly, rooms in mental 
health services are not required as patients can access it from home. Fourthly, it offers 
flexibility regarding the times and dates of sessions as it can be used 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week. Fifthly, it does not suffer some of the fallibilities of human therapists such as 
memory problems and fatigue. Finally, it allows privacy, consistency of care and easy data 
collection.  
CBM-I is also well placed with the recent Mental Health Outcomes Strategy of the 
National Operating Framework for the NHS 2012/2013 (Department of Health, 2011) 
which calls for more innovative and choice of treatments for patients in the least restrictive 
environment. CBM-I could provide patients who have anxiety disorders such as GAD with 
a new, standalone treatment as a potential option in stepped care, which could be helpful as 
a waitlist initiative or for those who do not respond to or cannot access current treatments. 
This is important as many people who might benefit from treatment for anxiety disorders 
are unable or unwilling to seek it (Kessler et al., 2005). CBM-I is also in keeping with the 
recent movement towards convergent treatments of anxiety disorders as it focuses on 
transdiagnostic mechanisms.  
There is some overlap between CBM-I and conventional CT approaches such as 
CBT. Both attempt to modify cognitive processes believed to maintain anxiety and both 
involve systematic exposure to the events that trigger it (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). 
However in traditional CT the method of change is to directly challenge accessible 
thoughts believed to be generating anxiety. CBM-I on the other hand involves changing a 
specific cognitive process that lies outside of conscious awareness, which gives rise to such 
thoughts. The present study is aware of only one study that has investigated the efficacy of 
CBM-I against a CT-based treatment (Bowler et al., 2012), although with a non-clinical 
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sample.  
As mentioned previously, Bowler et al. (2012) compared CBM-I with cCBT and 
found that both groups reported significantly reduced levels of social anxiety and trait 
anxiety relative to the control group but that CBM-I was significantly more effective at 
reducing negative interpretation bias. As a standalone treatment, CBM-I has some potential 
advantages over CT-based interventions. For example, as Bowler et al. (2012) noted, 
CBM-I does not rely on insight or disclosure. This may be helpful for patients who find it 
difficult or who are unwilling to reflect on their own thinking patterns or to disclose 
personal thoughts and emotions, even to a computer. Also, CBM-I operates in a manner 
more congruent with the biases it seeks to modify (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). As Beard 
(2011) explained, biases are relatively automatic in nature and so can be thought of as 
habits. With this reasoning, repeated experiential practice on tasks, as occurs with CBM-I, 
would appear to be a superior strategy for achieving bias modification than verbal dialogue 
and explicit instruction, as occurs with CT-based approaches (MacLeod & Mathews, 
2012).    
Alternatively CBM-I may be an effective adjunctive therapeutic tool. Combining 
CBM-I with CT-based treatments may lead to optimal results if the former serves to alter 
cognitive bias of threatening thinking at a more habitual level and the latter challenges the 
believability of these negative thoughts (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). CBM-I may be 
helpful for patients experiencing difficulties in cognitive restructuring by bypassing some 
of their automatic mental habits. Likewise CBM-I may augment exposure treatments as it 
does not require feared situations to be physically confronted for change to occur. 
Individuals who are initially unwilling to engage in exposure could receive CBM-I prior to 
CT. Evidence is now emerging that combining CBM and CT-based paradigms can indeed 
improve outcomes (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011) and that this is an 
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effective therapeutic partnership for individuals with GAD (Amir & Taylor, 2012b).  
4.9 Conclusion  
 In conclusion, the results of the present study indicate the potential value of 
CBM-I in ameliorating negative interpretation bias in individuals presenting with some of 
the symptomatology that is associated with GAD. However the findings concerning the 
ability of CBM-I to reduce worry are equivocal as only two of the seven participants 
demonstrated a positive response in their level of worry (participants four & six); in both 
cases gains maintained one week after CBM-I completion. The findings need to be 
considered carefully within the methodological constrains of the current study. At this 
point in time, further exploration and development of CBM-I for reducing pathological 
worry using patients meetings meeting GAD diagnostic criteria is warranted. Qualitative 
feedback indicates that extending the duration of CBM-I and ensuring that scenarios are 
perceived as meaningful; achieved possibly by matching scenarios to users’ main disclosed 
worries, may be ways of enhancing the training effect. As a clinical tool, CBM-I has many 
advantageous features and is well placed within current NHS strategies. The present study 
advances CBM-I research by extending findings on the efficacy of online, home-accessed, 
multi-session, imagery-focused CBM-I for patients experiencing clinical levels of 
generalised anxiety.   
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Appendix A: Recruitment Activity Log 
Date Recruitment Activity Location 
10/06/13 Met with City locality Clinical Lead and discussed 
study and recruiting. 
Hellesdon Hospital, 
Norwich 
14/08/13 Presented study to clinicians at East Locality business 
meeting and emailed study information to an Enhanced 
Therapist. 
Northgate Hospital, 
Great Yarmouth 
09/09/13 Met with Suffolk Clinical Lead and discussed study and 
recruiting.  
G-block, Ipswich 
11/09/13 Met with Enhanced CBT Therapist and discussed study 
and recruiting. 
Northgate Hospital, 
Great Yarmouth 
20/09/13 Arranged to meet with West Locality Clinical Lead but 
she could not make it. She advised that her service did 
not have capacity to refer currently.  
Northgate Hospital, 
Great Yarmouth 
27/09/13 Emailed East Locality Clinical Lead and asked to re-
present at next team meeting. Also emailed Suffolk 
Clinical Lead for an update.  
NA 
15/10/13 Presented study to clinicians at centrality locality 
business meeting.  
Gateway House, 
Wymondham 
15/10/13 Emailed Enhanced CBT therapist about study and 
recruiting. 
NA 
15/10/13 Met with PWP Lead and discussed study and 
recruiting. 
Northgate Hospital, 
Great Yarmouth 
06/11/13 Emailed Enhanced Therapist from City Locality who 
said would go through waitlist. Also emailed an 
Enhanced Therapist from East Locality requesting 
referrals.   
NA 
13/11/13 Emailed another City Locality Lead and requested 
study information to be distributed to clinicians across 
the locality.  
NA 
27/11/13 Met with three PWPs and discussed recruiting.   
 
Northgate Hospital, 
Great Yarmouth 
17/12/13 Met with three Enhanced Therapists and discussed 
study, left message with a PWP and emailed an 
Enhanced Therapist with study information.   
Northgate Hospital, 
Great Yarmouth 
08/01/14 Emailed PWP requesting referrals.  NA 
08/01/14 Emailed East Locality, West Locality, City Locality, 
South Locality Clinical Leads, and two PWP Leads 
asking for referrals.   
NA 
15/01/14 Presented to PWPs at West Locality team meeting. Queen Elizabeth 
Hospital, Kings 
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Lynn 
28/01/14 Presented study to a PWP supervision session.  Mariner house, 
Ipwsich 
11/02/14 Emailed West Locality PWP lead requesting more 
referrals.  
NA 
18/02/14 Emailed PWP Lead from East Locality requesting 
referrals.  
NA 
04/03/14 Emailed all past referrers requesting referrals.   NA 
06/03/14 Emailed Suffolk Clinical Lead and requested referrals.  NA 
13/03/14 Presented study to two PWP supervision sessions.  Mariner house, 
Ipwsich 
26/03/14 Emailed Suffolk Clinical Lead requesting referrals. NA 
31/03/14 Emailed different Suffolk Clinical Lead requesting 
referrals.  
NA 
31/03/14 Spoke to a city locality PWP Lead about study and 
recruiting.  
Hellesdon Hospital, 
Norwich 
01/04/14 Presented study to clinicians at City Locality team 
meeting. 
Hellesdon Hospital, 
Norwich 
01/04/14 Emailed West Locality PWP Lead requesting more 
referrals. 
NA 
Note. This is not an exhaustive list of all recruitment related activity but rather that for 
which correspondence is contained in the researcher’s email inbox.   
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Appendix B: The Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) 
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Appendix C: The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-Q-IV) 
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Appendix D: The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
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Appendix E: The Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) 
Visual Analogue Scales: Version 1 (03/01/2013) 
  
Study Participant Number: 
 
The following scales are to be completed daily, at the same time every day. Please 
indicate below the date, time and whether it was before or after CBM-I training session for 
that day of completion. Please indicate by marking on the lines below, your response to the 
questions or statements; please consider your answers based on today.   
 
Date: Time:            Before CBM-I / After CBM-I (circle) 
 
 
 
 
How anxious have you felt over the past 24 hours? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please answer the following statement: 
When I imagine outcomes for events, I expect the worst. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      100 
Extremely 
      0 
Not at all 
      100 
Extremely 
      0 
Not at all 
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Appendix F: The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Assessment (GAD-7) 
GAD-7 Patient Questionnaire 
 
Participant Identification Number: _________________________  Date: ________ 
 
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any of the following 
problems? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Not at all Several 
Days 
More 
than half 
the days 
Nearly 
every day 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 
 
1.  Feeling nervous, anxious or 
on edge. 
0 1 2 3 
 
 
2.  Not being able to stop or 
control worrying. 
0 1 2 3 
 
 
3.  Worrying too much about 
different things.  
0 1 2 3 
 
 
4.  Trouble relaxing. 0 1 2 3 
 
5.  Being so restless that it’s 
hard to sit still. 
 
0 1 2 3 
 
 
6.  Becoming easily annoyed or 
irritable. 
0 1 2 3 
 
 
7.  Feeling afraid as if 
something awful might happen. 
 
0 1 2 3 
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Appendix G: An Example Scrambled Sentences Test (SST) 
 
SCRAMBLED SENTENCE TEST  
Unscramble the sentences to form statements.  Each of the scrambled 
sentences contains six words.  Unscramble five words in each sentence by 
placing a number over each of the five words indicating the proper order. 
For example: 
 
 3     4        2     1    5 
has green child the eyes blue 
 
Each sentence can be unscrambled into more than one statement, but you 
should choose only one statement to unscramble.  You have 4 minutes to 
unscramble as many sentences as possible. Work as quickly and as accurately 
as possible. 
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me support people love I leave  
my past I’m of ashamed proud  
enough money I’ll have always never  
badly others think of me well  
as people me irresponsible view responsible  
appear to sensible I foolish others  
are poor my good credentials work  
rarely me always sensations strange bother  
my are bad good job prospects  
falling I never behind always am 
stupid come as capable I across 
a rarely headaches tumour signal often  
okay will end up I poor 
goals my eventually happen will never 
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usually are palpitations harmless harmful heart  
regularly mistakes make I bad rarely  
find mostly ugly attractive me people 
make I bad impression a good  
are attacks threatening aren’t life panic  
health likely my will worsen improve  
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Write the 6 digit number in the box below 
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Appendix H: All 80 Scrambled Sentences (in no particular order) 
 
my past I’m of ashamed proud 
I enough cannot can fast work  
me tend people to accept judge  
ignore will bother stranger the me  
the I say wrong things right  
usually are palpitations harmless harmful heart  
succeed fail I at work will 
light common can alarming be headedness  
find mostly ugly attractive me people 
assertive can be I cannot very 
up normally can’t I keep can  
very looks angry excited the dog  
appear to sensible I foolish others  
stupid come as capable I across  
cannot bills I pay my can 
okay will end up I poor  
my reach will goals I won’t  
successes my many failures life contains  
new approaching risky is fine people  
with unhappy appearance I’m happy my  
unmanageable usually manageable is workload the  
good bad look think I I 
health likely my will worsen improve  
interesting my others opinion boring find 
look I fool a won’t will  
will things better worse get probably 
about pessimistic the I’m future optimistic  
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think loveable I am I unloveable  
regularly mistakes make I bad rarely  
accident I’ll avoid have an probably 
up will I crashing won’t end  
can’t can I good jobs get 
enough money I’ll have always never  
are attacks threatening aren’t life panic 
indifferent opinion I’m others’ worried about  
I’m people confident nervous new with  
I errors make typically many few  
social circles anxious in I’m comfortable  
things cannot many I afford can 
I’ll rate this at quit manage 
produce I work can’t can accurate 
many things right go can wrong  
my are bad good job prospects  
a rarely headaches tumour signal often  
I social dread usually love gatherings  
won’t will of disapprove others me  
with relaxed I people stressed am  
care about people do me don’t 
will me most help hurt people  
possible deadlines keeping impossible is to  
annoying little is getting sleep harmful  
to me good bad happen things  
employers many few me will hire  
merits my other notice people faults  
easy people uneasy other with I’m 
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problems my end financial will continue 
much haven’t I very have achieved  
never my achieve definitely ambitions I’ll 
face will always won’t hardship I  
I’m with reflection comfortable my uncomfortable 
usually from people I withdraw don’t  
have lot accomplished a I haven’t  
rarely me always sensations strange bother  
as people me irresponsible view responsible  
to friendships easy maintain difficult it’s  
stay uncomfortable feelings pass tend to  
buy can many I things can’t  
me support people love I leave  
with something nothing me wrong there’s  
goals my eventually happen will never  
are poor my good credentials work  
falling I never behind always am  
mostly the is safe world scary  
on scared own I’m my okay  
blunders can cannot making I avoid  
make I bad impression a good  
badly others think of me well  
will out my run won’t money  
able I’m finish to unable things  
listen others to don’t do me 
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Appendix I: CBM-I Task Instructions 
 
First screen of instructions. 
In this task you will be presented with descriptions of many different situations.  Each 
description consists of four lines of text.  Each line of text will appear when you press the 
downward arrow on the keyboard.  The last line of text always has the final word missing 
from it.  When you press the downward arrow key again, the missing word will appear but 
it will have some letters missing.  (For example, ‘a_azi_g: the 'm' and 'n' is missing from 
'amazing'). 
 
Please try to picture in your head each situation to help you fill in the word using the right 
letter(s).  When you know what the unfinished word is, press the downward arrow key.  
Then enter the FIRST missing letter (in the ‘amazing’ example above, this would be 'm'), 
by finding this letter on the keyboard and pressing that letter key.  When you have pressed 
the key the missing word will show on your computer screen. 
 
Then, after each situation, a question will be shown on your screen. This is to check you 
have understood, so remember to answer it based on the situation you have just read.  For 
this you will be using the left (for NO) and right (for YES) arrow keys. When you begin the 
task each day, you will first have a practice situation.  
 
Click the underlined link below to continue. 
Second screen of instructions. 
Now, let’s talk about why you are doing this!  It has been suggested that imagining 
yourself in a range of unreal situations may help you to have less anxious feelings in real 
life. The goal of each computer session is to help you get used to being in lots of different 
situations and imagining positive outcomes. 
 
Importance of imagining yourself in the situations 
 
There will be many situations that do not apply to you personally or fit with your 
experiences. Some may even just seem downright silly to you. However, in order for you to 
get the most out of completing the sessions, it is really important that you create an image 
in your head of each situation as if you are the main person in it and it is actually 
happening. The more vividly you can imagine that you are in the situations, the more you 
will get out of the sessions. 
 
Also, when imagining that you are in the situations, try to imagine that you are looking 
out through your own eyes rather than looking at yourself in the situation. 
 
Imagery exercise: 
 
To help you with imagining yourself in each situation, an imagery exercise will follow. 
Please read the situation. For this exercise, the lines of text will appear automatically; you 
do not need to press the downward arrow key. Try to picture yourself in the situation. You 
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will then be asked to click on a number between 0 (you could not imagine it at all) and 10 
(you could imagine it perfectly, as if you were there). 
Click the underlined link below to continue. 
Third screen of instructions. 
Well done, that is the end of the imagery exercise. 
 
Next you will complete a practice situation. Don’t forget to imagine yourself in it. 
 
Click the underlined link below to continue. 
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Appendix J: Study Approval from the Proportionate Review Sub-Committee of the 
North West- Greater Manchester South National Research Ethics Service (NRES) 
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Appendix K: Study Approval from the Norfolk and Suffolk National Health Service 
Foundation Trust (NSFT) Local Research Governance Committee 
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Appendix L: Study Insurance Cover from the Research Enterprise and Engagement 
Department of the University of East Anglia (UEA) 
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Appendix M: Consent Form 
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Appendix N: Participant Information Sheet 
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Appendix O: Participant Details Sheet 
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Appendix P: Letter to Participant’s General Practitioner Notifying them of 
Participation 
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Appendix Q: Collection of Participant Feedback Quotes 
Positive cognitive change. 
Participant one: 
 ‘I found that it was actually making me think of the positive outcome rather 
 than just always assuming that it was going to be negative.’ 
 ‘It got me thinking more positively and I was instantly looking for the positive 
 outcomes.’ 
 ‘I just thought, you know, it doesn’t have to be negative and that got me to 
 thinking about the things that do cause my anxiety and how they don't have to be 
 negative and they could end differently and some things are in my control and that I 
 can do something to change things.’ 
 ‘I’ve almost taught myself to, to look at each situation that cause my anxiety 
 and try and sort of work out a different coping mechanism I suppose with it 
 and I don't know if that is to do with the computer program but it definitely did sort 
 of kick start a, a more positive attitude in my brain.’ 
 ‘I’ve just decided to try and start sort of living my life rather than being scared 
 of it.’ 
 Participant four:  
‘It’s like when I was out walking earlier you know, I’m sort of thinking ‘oh she’s 
gonna, she’s on the lead’ but I sometimes wonder if she’s going to run over the 
road and she never has so I sort of say to myself ‘she’s never done it so she’s not 
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gonna do it’, you know what I mean, so it’s, cos it’s these thoughts go in your head 
but now I, I am thinking of positive rather than negative.’ 
‘I keep doing these sort of positive things in my head you know because I still sort 
of think negative a lot you know like all you know ‘I can’t do this I can’t’, now I 
say ‘I can, you know, I can do it.’ 
Positive behavioural change. 
 Participant one:  
 ‘I’ve joined the gym which is a big thing for me because it means going out 
 and being with different people in an environment I’m not comfortable with, 
 erm, so that is something I wouldn’t of done a few weeks ago, erm which I saw 
 as a positive change for me and, I don’t know really, I’ve got, I’ve booked a 
 holiday for next year to go abroad with the two children in the last week which 
 is something which terrifies me.’ 
 ‘I’ve got on top of things again, I was letting things sort of defeat me like the 
 housework and things, I’ve er, I’ve gone on a cleaning rampage and er I’ve 
 done all sorts of things really.’ 
 ‘I’ve sort of been out and got my haircut and bought some new clothes and 
 sort of  feeling better about my self image.’ 
 ‘I’ve been putting like little plans of action together about things and it, it is 
 paying off it is making me feel better like I’m taking control over these 
 situations that were scaring me.’ 
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 Participant four: 
 ‘As I said about my erm going to slimming world and I have to talk in front of 
 everybody you know to sort of say what was happening and I sort of, I was 
 scared but I did it. I’ve done it two weeks now running and erm so I was really like 
 nervous. I could feel myself really red, you know when normally I never used to be 
 you know but, but I have said it you know I have talked I could have talked to her 
 at the beginning of the class, asked her not to speak to me, you know but I didn’t 
 so.’ 
 ‘At work last week erm I erm we sort of like, we’ve been in the top ten of erm 
 you know like for these like to like which are sort of like never been it before 
 which is like because you know the takings are going up and I got sort of  like 
 everybody around and sort of like told them and explained it to them what it 
 was and I went ‘thank you everyone’ like this and I wouldn’t have  done that before 
 do you know what I mean, I might have told them individually but I went and 
 told them all you know as a group.’ 
 ‘Doing more stuff so erm, even riding me bike you know erm I even rode it a 
 little bit in the wind yesterday and got blown off it twice, you know but I got 
 back on it so, you know what I mean it’s, it’s little things and like that  you 
 know.’ 
Suggesting extending the CBM-I. 
 Participant one: 
 ‘I felt like I could have done it for more than the seven days, I would have  quite 
 happily carried it on for a little while but I know it’s only a trial so I don't know if, 
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 if it’s made a sort of proper official treatment, will people be able to access it 
 more frequently or for more than the seven days at a time’.  
 Participant three: 
 ‘A smaller amount perhaps over a longer period of time might be a, a better 
 way of approaching it, that’s my personal opinion.’ 
 Participant five: 
 ‘I tell you what I did think would be a brilliant idea, if there was a package, a 
 computerised package, so you could actually put yourself online and go through 
 those scenarios on a regular basis, you’re not gonna be in those situations in 
 reality but if you can mentally assume yourself in those situations with those 
 positive outcomes, erm I think that might be quite beneficial to a lot of people, 
 we’re only doing it for that very short space  of time.’ 
Scenarios personally relevant and emotionally engaging. 
 Participant one:  
 ‘A lot of the erm, situations in it were very similar to the situations I find  myself 
 in or I’m scared of, so going through those and seeing the outcome  that I would 
 always imagine would always be the worst possible case you know erm 
 especially the scenarios where you’re put like at the centre of attention, you’re 
 on the spot, like, at work like and things you have to do, presentations and stuff 
 that absolutely terrifies me.’  
 ‘The first few times I did it I would get sort of like a panicky feeling because 
 you sort of really hit the nail on the head with the situation for someone like me, 
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 what causes my anxiety, and erm it would make me panic but then  towards 
 the end of the week it was more sort of like I knew it wasn’t gonna be a stressful 
 situation and I didn’t get that panicky feeling when I started reading it.’   
 Participant four: 
 ‘Well some of the scenarios erm you know they were sort of like funny as well 
 you know and I think that was sort of like you know and some others were real 
 you know what I called sort of I think ‘oh yeah I’ve been there’ you know  what I 
 mean and erm and that and it sometimes I was thinking in me head, you know, like 
 er, I wanted to put all ‘god no’ you, you know I wanted to press no when it is yes 
 and I think ‘no it’s yes’, you know what it’s sort of, it was like that I did press no 
 sometimes because it’s there in your head you, you know.’  
Scenarios not personally relevant or emotionally engaging. 
 Participant three:  
 ‘I found they were a little predictable and they are going to be because you got 
 three hundred questions in your head and so you are going to have similar 
 situations running through, there’s going to be a common thread.’ 
 ‘It’s not the real world, erm the real world is where I worry, erm too much, 
 yes, but erm they’re simply questions on how you’d react or should react in 
 situations, erm that was a little bit mechanical and er didn’t really bare 
 relevance to, I felt, to how I would feel on a day to day basis.’ 
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 Participant seven: 
 ‘I don't think it targeted the things that I was worried about so much, I feel 
 like it was, like a lot of the situations that were coming up, like people could 
 worry about going into those situations, they tended to always be things that I 
 didn’t worry about, I tend to worry about things happening like my family, 
 things like that and failing myself at university and not actually being going to 
 the shop and someone like, I’m not worried about that sort of thing.’ 
 ‘I was looking at the questions it was asking me and I’d think about myself in 
 that situation and it’s that ninety percent of those situations would never worry 
 me anyway.’ 
Positive opinion of CBM-I. 
 Participant one: 
 ‘Well, I think it works and I hope that it can be sort of used in the future for 
 other people because I do think the you know, the idea behind it is, is good 
 and I think it will make a difference to people.’ 
 Participant four: 
 ‘I’ve enjoyed doing it. Yeah I did, so, found it all helpful.’ 
Ambivalent opinion of CBM-I. 
 Participant two: 
 ‘It’s just, that would have been nice if I didn’t worry hardly at all but I still 
 worry but not as much as what I did so, but I don't know how the computer 
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 could have done that anyway if you know what I mean.’ 
 Participant three: 
 ‘I think it’s better to have a person, personally, rather than a computer program 
 although, although it’s got its positive aspects, I mean you’re still contributing, 
 you’re still doing something.’ 
 ‘How far it can go I, I don’t know.’ 
 Participant four: 
 ‘I think it’s a big ask you know it’s a big kind of ask isn’t it you know in so 
 many sessions to think that you are actually gonna, you’re not gonna cure  anybody 
 are you.’ 
 ‘So you’re talking about almost a long, a very, very long term anxiety, and 
 you’re not gonna cure that in just such a short time.’ 
 Participant seven: 
 ‘I wasn’t expecting anything to work because I’ve sort of had it; I’ve always 
 been worrying about things a lot in my eyes. It’s going to be very hard to not 
 worry about it so I’m not like disappointed it hasn’t worked or anything or, 
 because I was never that expectant of it at the beginning.’ 
 ‘I think it’s, for me it wasn’t very beneficial but I think for some people it  would 
 be if they worry about those situations a lot.’  
 
 
  
177 
 
Appendix R: End of Study Report Submitted to Norfolk and Suffolk National Health 
Service Foundation Trust (NSFT) Local Research Governance Committee and North 
West - Greater Manchester South National Research Ethics Service (NRES) 
 
Objectives 
The primary aim of the study was to investigate the efficacy of an online multi-session 
cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I) package for reducing worry and 
negative interpretive bias in individuals presenting with clinical levels of generalised 
anxiety. The secondary aim of the study was to explore how the patients experienced the 
CBM-I package. Both objectives were met.   
Design 
Regarding the primary objective, the study adopted a single case-series using a non-
concurrent multiple-baseline across participant design with follow-up. Regarding the 
secondary objective, the patients’ experiences were qualitatively analysed.   
Method 
Seven patients referred from Psychological Wellbeing Services completed a seven day 
CBM-I programme at home via the internet. The CBM-I task trained the participants to 
imagine ambiguous scenarios and to interpret them in a benign or positive manner. To 
assess change in worry, anxiety and interpretive bias, participants completed a battery of 
self report measures. Audio-taped semi-structured interviews were carried out with six of 
the participants. The transcribed interviews were analysed using template analysis. No 
ethical issues were encountered at any stage of the study.  
Results 
Two participants demonstrated a positive response in their level of worry upon starting the 
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CBM-I training and for both, gains were maintained one week after its completion. For the 
sample as a whole, negative interpretation bias reduced at post CBM-I and at one week 
follow-up.  The most salient themes identified in the transcribed interviews included the 
convenience of the CBM-I program, ambivalence, low expectations, interaction with the 
program changing over time, the emotional meaningfulness of the scenarios, the program 
being easy to interact with, understanding of the program, cognitive changes, difficulties 
remaining, improving usability and making the program last longer. All participants 
elected to receive a summary of the main findings and so this will be sent to them. No firm 
plans are yet in place to publish the results.  
Conclusions 
Regarding the primary objective, the results indicate the potential value of CBM-I as a 
clinical tool for modifying interpretation bias in patients experiencing clinical levels of 
generalised anxiety. The ability of CBM-I to attenuate generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) 
associated symptomatology appears equivocal. In light of methodological constraints, the 
findings are tentative warranting further investigation. Regarding the secondary objective, 
the findings indicate relationships existing between attitude towards the program, the 
emotional meaningfulness of the scenarios and perceived consequences. Taken together, 
the data indicates that extending the duration of CBM-I and ensuring that scenarios are 
perceived as meaningful to CBM-I users e.g. possibly by tailoring scenario training sets to 
user’s main disclosed worries, may be ways of enhancing the potency of CBM-I in treating 
pathological worry. In its current form, the CBM-I package would appear to offer benefit 
to some but not all patients experiencing clinical levels of generalised anxiety.  
 
 
